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INTRODUCTION
Chuck makes a joke. The joke hurts Gladys, who complains,
"That's not funny!" If Gladys presses her view, ascribing blame and
demanding redress, a court matches her hurt with rules of law. Car-
ried to its logical conclusion, this legal process regulates Chuck's joke,
sending a message about whether society likes his humor. The law
can regulate Chuck's joke in wildly varying ways. Depending on con-
text, the law may insulate, tolerate, encourage, condemn, or suppress
Chuck's humor.' To resolve the controversy between Chuck and
Gladys, a court may even need to determine whether it agrees that
Chuck's joke is-indeed- not funny.
The stakes are high here. To begin, where humor is stifled, the
First Amendment hangs in the balance. Most potentially humorous
utterances are actionable precisely because of their content-a key
trigger for First Amendment protection. To a limited extent, scholars
have explored this ramification of humor regulation, particularly in
the context of sexual harassment litigation. 2 Yet even leaving aside
core First Amendment values, regulating humor implicates other im-
portant concerns nowhere discussed in case law or legal scholarship. 3
I So what's the deal with the names? Comic wisdom has it that certain names and
sounds are funnier than others. "Gladys," "Chuck," and words with hard consonant sounds
.are some of the funniest ones. See Tad Friend, What's So Funny?: A Scientific Attempt to
Discover Why We Laugh, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 2002, at 78, 90.
2 The choice to characterize humor regulation as a First Amendment issue tends, not
surprisingly, to encourage scholarship advocating regulation reduction. See, e.g., DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN'T SAY THAT! THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDIS-
CRIMINATION LAWS 34 (2003) (describing "the corrosive effect of hostile environment law
on freedom of expression"); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 481, 491-510 (1991) (arguing that
hostile work environment liability leads to unconstitutional viewpoint regulation); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, and Harassment Law, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,
11 15-22 (illustrating how sexual harassment law can be unconstitutional); Eugene
Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L.J.
627, 635-37 (1997) [hereinafter Volokh, Hostile Work Environment] (arguing that "harass-
ment law can suppress core protected speech"). But cf J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2304-06, 2319 (1999) (asserting that harassment
law's effect of censoring free expression is justified).
3 With the exception of articles touching on sexual harassment litigation and the
First Amendment, legal scholarship on humor is largely confined to works analyzing or
cataloguing humor in the law or about the law, such as humorous opinions, lawyer jokes, or
comical law review articles. See, e.g., CORPUSJURIs HUMOROUS Uohn B. McClay & Wendy L.
Matthews eds., 1991) (compilation of humorous opinions and other legal materials); LE-
GAL ANECDOTES, WIT, AND REJOINDER (Edward J. Bander ed., 2007) (compilation of witty
legal material); Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of Clever and Amusing Law Review Writings:
An Idiosyncratic Bibliography of Miscellany with in Kind Annotations Intended as a Humorous
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Scholars working in social sciences, natural sciences, and the humani-
ties document many beneficial qualities of humor, benefits as wide
ranging as pain relief, social cohesion, and creativity.4 That's not to
say that humor doesn't have its downsides. 5 Prudence suggests, how-
ever, that a thoughtful decision to regulate humor should distinguish
situations where humor fosters good from those where humor pro-
duces negative effects.
Given humor's significant social consequences, one might expect
courts to consider these effects in rendering decisions that implicate
humor. Yet courts speak explicitly to the effects of humor only spo-
radically. 6 In part, then, this Article's goal is to bring greater aware-
ness to law's regulatory effect on humor.
Diversion for the Gentle Reader, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 105 (2002); Anthony D'Amato, Harmful
Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329, 330 (1991) (arguing that
harassment law regulates speech on the basis of content and that courts should not recog-
nize causes of action where "the factfinder and/or decisionmaker must arrive at a judg-
ment ... that harm must have occurred because the particular utterance in question is
itself harm producing"); Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel,
Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REv. 923, 924-28 (1985) (de-
crying the chilling effect of copyright, trademark, and libel laws on satiric expression);
Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in America: The View from the Joke Corpus, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2223 (2002) (analyzing jokes about lawyers and justice); Adalberto Jor-
dan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 693 (1987) (analyzing
humor, sarcasm, and other figurative language in judicial opinions); J.T. Knight, Com-
ment, Humor and the Law, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 897 (exploring humor-or lack thereof-in
law review articles); Symposium on Humor and the Law, 1992 BYU L. REv. 313 (compiling
articles parodying areas of the law, discussing funny opinions, satirizing legal education,
legal academia, and legal scholarship, and listing works about these subjects).
One notable exception is a relatively short piece, Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, No
Laughing Matter: Humor and Contradictions in Stories of Law, 50 DEPAuL L. REv. 559 (2000),
that exposes sociological and cultural aspects of law by identifying and interpreting "hu-
morous stories . .. that people tell about law." Id. at 560.
4 See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the beneficial and detrimental effects of humor.
5 See infra Part I.C.
6 Parody provides the best vehicle for courts to discuss humor's effect. See, e.g., L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that parody is
"deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and liter-
ary criticism" (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)));
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(rejecting a copyright violation and proclaiming that "in today's world of often unrelieved
solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody"). In evaluating
legal claims involving parody, courts are, in fact, earnest in relying on formal definitions of
humor set forth in dictionaries and literary theory. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (discussing the Greek definition of parodeia in evaluating
copyright liability for alleged parody); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Aldous Huxley and communications
scholars in stressing the role of parody in society); L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 28 (invoking
Homer, Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, and Voltaire's Candide in evaluating trademark liability
for alleged parody); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279 n.I 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing The American Heritage Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary defini-
tions of "parody" in evaluating trademark liability for alleged parody).
For an unusually thoughtful example of a court grappling with the importance of
protecting humorous expression in an employment discrimination case, see McIntyre v.
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But I hold greater ambition for this project. Humor occurs in
most aspects of human life and, accordingly, appears in a wide variety
of legal contexts. In this inaugural attempt to identify themes in hu-
mor regulation, I assess three diverse legal subjects: contract, trade-
mark, and employment discrimination. (I briefly reckon with
constitutional law, which weaves in and out of the three doctrinal con-
texts.) My assessment yields a rough taxonomy. As a starting point,
the case law divides into two groups: instances in which the court's
decision to regulate turns on whether the disputed communication is
humorous and those in which the court regulates the communication
irrespective of whether it is funny.
Take the joke between Chuck and Gladys. Let's say Chuck had
offered to trade his car to Gladys in exchange for her walking on his
back in high heels. In the first category of cases, courts actually en-
gage with the question of whether Chuck's offer was indeed ajoke. If
the answer is "yes, Chuck made a joke," the law explicitly removes the
communication from legal restriction-thereby protecting Chuck
from civil liability. Chuck might avoid contract liability, for example,
if a court decides that Chuck's statement to Gladys was no more than
a drunken jest about trading his car, simply ajoke rather than a legally
enforceable contract.7 The court's decision allows the joke (and
others like it) to thrive, unfettered by legal obligations.8 This analysis
also occurs in trademark litigation, where courts in essence conclude
that the level ofjest is so high that no harm to an intellectual property
interest occurs.9
It may seem fishy or wrong for courts to make the editorial judg-
ment of whether something is humorous. Remarkably, though, the
cases are often straightforward, tracking relatively formalistic legal
analysis. The humor-regulating enterprise becomes more problem-
atic, however, in the second category of humor regulation, where
courts impose liability without regard to whether the communication
is funny. In this category, courts instead focus on whether a commu-
Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 669 N.Y.S.2d 122, 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting
that when humor "is good-natured and harmless it may relieve the tensions imposed by the
pressures of daily life").
7 See, e.g., Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976 F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("'1T]he parties to a legal transaction may always show that they understood a
purported contract not to bind them; it may, for example, be a joke .... .'" (quoting In re
H. Hicks & Son, Inc., 82 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1936))).
8 Of course, if the court incorrectly decides that the statement is not a jest and is
therefore actionable, the court is discouraging others from making such statements in the
future. The erroneous decision-and the specter that other similarly erroneous decisions
will occur-thereby discourages such humorous statements.
9 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Under our cases parody and
satire are valued forms of criticism, encouraged because this sort of criticism itself fosters
the creativity protected by the copyright law.").
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nication is sufficiently harmful as to justify stifling it. Examples of this
category are common in sexual harassment and employment cases
and appear occasionally in trademark cases as well. (So, for example,
a harassment issue may arise if Chuck and Gladys worked together
when he spoke of trading his car.) Functionalism and indeterminacy
abound in the trademark and harassment opinions; they embody in-
consistencies and irrationalities, qualities common to all types of cases
in which courts struggle to make difficult choices between competing
alternatives.
One remarkable quality of all the humor-regulating opinions is
their faithful (yet tacit) tracking of humor theory espoused by nonle-
gal thinkers. Humor theory provides a scholarly grounding for the
dichotomy between humorous communications that avoid liability
and those that do not. In particular, cases evaluating whether a partic-
ular communication is a joke that should avoid liability focus on what
humor scholars denominate "incongruity" humor. By contrast, those
cases regulating apparent jest-even if all were to agree that the jest is
funny-concern communications that hew more closely to what schol-
ars call "superiority" and "release" humor. Courts are more likely to
protect humor based on incongruity than humor tied to superiority or
release: incongruous humor thus tends to avoid law's grip, while supe-
riority humor or release humor triggers legal control. As with any
generality of this sort, the case law does not sort perfectly. Nonethe-
less, understanding how the dichotomy between protected and unpro-
tected humor operates provides a useful heuristic for case law analysis.
This Article first surveys definitions of humor and humor theories
refined by philosophers, social scientists, and other nonlegal thinkers.
Turning to the law, the next Part analyzes how courts treat humorous
communications in contract, trademark, and sexual harassment cases,
evaluating these legal categories in light of humor scholarship and
mapping the coincidence between law and humor theory. This Arti-
cle then assesses the beneficial and potentially detrimental conse-
quences of courts' current patterns in humor regulation, concluding
that the law closely integrates social norms about appropriate hu-
mor-a state of affairs that should inspire both celebration and
concern.
I
DEFINING AND THEORIZING FUNNY
No, the concept of a "humor theorist" is not part of some satire
about academics. The subject of humor has in fact captured scholars'
attention for centuries.10 Recent years have brought intense interdis-
10 See, e.g., infra notes 52, 59, 84 and accompanying text.
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ciplinary study of humor. 1 Not surprisingly, however, academic effort
has not yielded any final definition of humor. 12 After all, defining
humor is about as ironic as defining postmodernism: the object to be
defined mocks precise exposition. Humor itself rejects attempts to
capture the essence of anything. Even more problematic, the process
of describing humor can be counterproductive, acting as a "wet blan-
ket."'13 Because humor derives largely from emotion and intuition,
attempts to bring rational cognition to bear on it can actually deflate
comedy.14
Undaunted by the elusive quality of humor, scholars have pro-
duced volumes discussing what humor means for human beings. Af-
ter exploring these attempts to define humor and to delineate its
11 There's even a refereed, interdisciplinary journal of humor research and an aca-
demic group, the International Society for Humor Studies, which holds yearly conferences
around the world. International Society for Humor Studies, HUMOR: International Jour-
nal of Humor Research, http://www.hnu.edu/ishs/JournalCenter.htm#About (last visited
Apr. 3, 2009); International Society for Humor Studies, http://www.hnu.edu/ishs/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009). Among the disciplines represented in the interdisciplinary effort are
rhetoric, semiotics, communication theory, psychoanalysis, philosophy, political science,
sociology, and literature. See ARTHUR ASA BERGER, BLIND MEN AND ELEPHANTS: PERSPECTIVE
ON HUMOR 9-16 (1995) (canvassing disciplines that might inform humor theory).
12 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 11, at 3 ("[Hlumor continues to confound us. We've
never figured out how to deal with it."); HENRI BERGSON, LAUGHTER: AN ESSAY ON THE
MEANING OF THE COMIC 1 (Cloudesley Brereton & Fred Rothwell trans., 1911) ("The great-
est of thinkers, from Aristotle downwards, have tackled this little problem, which has a
knack of baffling every effort, of slipping away and escaping only to bob up again, a pert
challenge flung at philosophic speculation."); Friend, supra note 1, at 93 ("Seeking a thor-
oughgoing explanation for humor is like seeking the Fountain of Youth, or the Philoso-
pher's Stone-it is a quest not for a tangible goal but for a beguiling idea."); Jonathan
Swift, To MR. DELANY (1718), reprinted in 39 THE WORKS OF THE ENGLISH POETS 159 (Sa-
muel Johnson ed., 1779) ("What humour is, not all the tribe / Of logick-mongers can
describe .... ").
13 Ewick & Silbey, supra note 3 (noting that by analyzing humor "we become the ulti-
mate wet blanket"); see also ROBERT R. PROVINE, LAUGHTER: A SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 11
(2000) ("Philosophy is to science what alcohol is to sex: It may stir the imagination, fire the
passions, and get the process underway, but the actual implementation may be flawed, and
the end result may come up short."); E.B. White, Preface to A SUBTREASURY OF AMERICAN
HUMOR Xi, xvii (E.B. White & Katharine S. White eds., 1941) (asserting that "[h]umor can
be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are discourag-
ing to any but the pure scientific mind").
14 At least for postmodernism, an attempt at definition can assist in establishing one
of the messages of postmodernist theory-the message that reducing complex matters to a
simple essence inaccurately portrays the nuances of existence, is inherently unreliable, and
fails to account for competing perspectives. See, e.g., David J. Herman, Modernism Versus
Postmodernism: Towards an Analytic Distinction, 12 POETICS TODAY 55, 75 (1991) (comment-
ing on importance of postmodernist view that "aspects of the world [are] irreducible to any
given representational scheme"); Patrick O'Donnell, Editor's Preface: Postmodern Narratives,
41 MOD. FICTION STUD. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that one of postmodernism's attractions lies in
difficulty of defining term itself); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and
Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992) (venturing
a definition of postmodernism, including recognition that "[t] here can be no such thing as
knowledge of reality" and "all propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are them-
selves social constructions").
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qualities, this Part reviews three main theories of humor and then de-
scribes normative judgments about humor's effects.
A. Defining Humor (or Not)
1. Common Ground
Scholars trying to define humor agree on a number of things.
Most begin by confessing the impossibility of identifying a precise or
all-encompassing definition.1 5 Next, scholars agree that humor pos-
sesses an array of human aspects: social, cognitive, emotional, psychophysi-
ological, and behavioral.16 The social quality of humor is pervasive: even
when humor occurs in an apparently nonsocial setting-such as when
a solitary person is amused-the context is "pseudo-social," as the per-
son is likely responding to a memory or recording that involves
others.1 7 Humor's cognitive components include the mental processes
involved in the "perception, creation, understanding, and apprecia-
tion" of humorous communication.' 8 As for humor's emotional as-
pects, scholars mention "pleasurable feelings of amusement,
exhilaration, and joy"' 9 as well as the dark side: "greater depression
and anxiety"20 that humor might provoke. In related literature, psy-
chologists have documented humor's psychophysiological effects to in-
clude "brain wave pattern changes," activation of the "autonomic
nervous system," and hormone production. 21 For behavioral aspects of
humor, several recent studies have focused on laughter, described as a
physical act separate from humor itself22 and sometimes wholly unre-
lated to amusement. 23  Other behavioral responses include "facial
15 See, e.g.,JON E. ROECKELEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR 9 (2002) (quoting various
people commenting on the difficulty of defining humor).
16 Id. at 23 (citing Rod A. Martin, Humor and Laughter, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOL-
oGY 202, 202 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000)).
17 ROD A. MARTIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 5-6
(2007).
18 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 23 (citing Martin, supra note 16).
19 Id.
20 Nicholas A. Kuiper et al., Humor Is Not Always the Best Medicine: Specific Components of
Sense of Humor and Psychological Well-Being, 17 HUMOR: INT'L J. HUMOR RES. 135, 144,
161-62 (2004).
21 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 23 (citing Martin, supra note 16, at 202).
22 Antony J. Chapman & Hugh C. Foot, Introduction to the Transaction Edition of Hu-
MOR AND LAUGHTER: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS, at vii, xiv (AntonyJ. Chapman
& Hugh C. Foot eds., Transaction Publishers 1996) (1976) (noting that laughter often
includes "'challenging looks-intense with narrowed eyes' and a 'pleased or prideful
look"' (quoting Herbert M. Lefcourt et al., Locus of Control and the Expression of Humor, 42J.
PERSONALITY 130, 136 (1974))).
23 See, e.g., PROVINE, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that most laughter is produced by
speakers, not listeners, and typically results from factors other than witticisms); ROECK-
ELEIN, supra note 15, at 40-51 (observing that laughter is often unrelated to amusement);
John Tierney, What's So Funny? Well, Maybe Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at F1
(describing recent studies linking laughter with functions unrelated to humor).
2009] 1241
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grimaces, teeth-baring, guttural vocalizations, [and] postural . . .
changes.."24 Finally, scholars agree on the conditional nature of hu-




In the humor-defining enterprise, scholars have devoted much
energy to listing different types. Legal scholars not being the only
thinkers prone to prolific categorization efforts, philosophers, literary
theorists, and psychologists have identified as many as twenty-one vari-
eties of humor. Major categories include comedy, formal jokes,
"wit, . . . satire, sarcasm, parody, puns, . . . and practical joking."26
Scholars often put comedy in its own category, "embedded, his-
torically, in . . . literature and the literary." 27 Indeed, those studying
dramatic comedy traditionally distinguished wit from humor,2 a dis-
tinction shadowed in contemporary literature today. Wit was associ-
ated with intelligence, involving cleverness, ideas, and wordplay, while
humor was associated with the human character, often invoking sym-
pathy and benevolence. 29 Wit was also viewed as socially constructed
and allied with the intellectual thought, while humor was regarded as
more natural and allied with the imagination. 30 Not surprisingly, the
two categories had social connotations, with wit associated with upper
classes and humor being "a more bourgeois, middle-class concept, as-
24 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 23 (citing Martin, supra note 16, at 202).
25 See, e.g., TED COHEN, JOKES: PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS ON JOKING MATTERS 12
(1999) (explaining that jokes can work only with certain audiences and are usually di-
rected only at those audiences); Chapman & Foot, supra note 22 (explaining that the
"type" of individual hearing a joke is important to the appreciation of humor; qualities
such as "control, conservatism, and sensation-seeking" are important, as are an individual's
concerns of "sex, aggression, and affiliation"); Jerry Palmer, Parody and Decorum: Permission
to Mock, in BEYOND A JOKE: THE LIMITS OF HUMOUR 79, 80 (Sharon Lockyer & Michael
Pickering eds., 2005) ("[H]umour needs to be both understood and permitted in order to
be a joke . . ").
26 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 13.
27 Id. at 56.
28 MICHAEL BILLIG, LAUGHTER AND RIDICULE: TOWARDS A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF HUMOUR
61 (2005); MARTIN, supra note 17, at 23.
29 MARTIN, supra note 17, at 23; see also BILLIG, supra note 28, at 61. Billig explains
that the word "humor" derives from the psychological term "humours," which referred to
bodily fluids thought to bestow certain temperaments on individuals. Id. at 61-62. Thus,
"a 'humorist' was not originally a comical writer but a person with an extreme character
that seemed to comprise a single humour rather than a balance of various humours." Id. at
62.
30 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 27; see alsoJOHN MORREALL, TAKING LAUGHTER SERI-
OUSLY 64 (1983) (noting the view that the term "humor" describes "'what is observed,'"
while "wit" occurs within the observer's mind (quoting RICHARD BOSTON, AN ANATOMY OF
LAUGHTER 60-61 (1974))).
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sociated with universality and democracy. '31 Although the suggestion
that some funny communications are more socially desirable than
others remains important for understanding humor in general and
legal regulation in particular, the term "humor" has now become "the
umbrella term for all things laughable." 32
Another distinct category of humor is formal jokes, defined as
"prepackaged humorous anecdotes that people memorize and pass
on to one another."33 Scholars note thatjokes come and go with the
fashions and, in fact, are currently out of favor. 34 Much literature re-
flects the view that women tend to dislike formal jokes.35 Expanding
on this observation, some thinkers have opined that the prominence
of the formal joke as a vehicle for humor has diminished as women's
role in society has changed.3 6
Jokes are sometimes grouped with puns and riddles. Riddles in-
volve a guessing game, and punning is word play. 37 Unlike riddles
and puns, however, jokes do not necessarily have a linguistic connec-
tion.38 This is particularly true for practical jokes, which are normally
viewed as "tricks" played "on another person that would normally be
viewed as rather unkind."39 Puns are allied with wit and therefore en-
joy preference in humor literature.40
Satire, sarcasm, and parody are related: all are aimed at derision 4 1
and do not always operate subtly. 4 2 All three can contain other types
of humor, such as exaggeration and ridicule. 43 Yet, while joviality may
accompany parody, the same is not true for satire and sarcasm. As
one author observes, "[L]aughter is not the chief aim of the satirist,
31 MARTIN, supra note 17, at 23; see, e.g., DANIEL WICKBERG, THE SENSES OF HUMOR:
SELF AND LAUGHTER IN MODERN AMERICA 59 (1998) (observing that an "aristocratic/bour-
geois split" was always present in the "wit/humor distinction").
32 MARTIN, supra note 17, at 23.
33 Id. at 11.
-4 See Warren St. John, Seriously, The Joke Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 9, at 1
(reporting the view that the joke-telling population changes with cultural shifts).
35 See, e.g., HERBERT M. LEFCOURT, HUMOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LIVING BUOYANTLY 158
(2001) (reporting on clinical studies demonstrating that women favor anecdotal humor).
36 Warren St. John, supra note 34 (describing joke telling as generally a masculine
pursuit that diminished in popularity with women's changing roles).
37 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 64-65.
38 Id. at 66 ("The term joke-when applied to a story or remark-suggests something
designed to promote good humor, especially an anecdote with a humorous twist ... .
39 MARTIN, supra note 17, at 126.
40 See id. at 45 ("[Pluns have their origins in ancient 'duels of wits.'"); ROECKELEIN,
supra note 15, at 65 (discussing the wide use of puns as a literary device).
41 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 61-62.
42 LAUGHING MATrERS: A SEIOUS LooK AT HUMOUR 76 (John Durant & Jonathan
Miller eds., 1988).




nor is the effect of ... satire to provoke loud laughter."'4 4 Another
important factor distinguishing parody from satire and sarcasm is "in-
tertextuality. ' ' 45 Unlike a satire or sarcastic statement, a parody over-
laps with the text serving as the its object. This overlap, which allows
the audience to recognize the original text within the parody, 46 can
take the form of expressive style, characteristics of a particular genre
(e.g., science fiction, fairy tale, folk song), or a specific text (e.g., Star
Trek or Snow White) .47 Whatever the parody's form, however, theorists
are more upbeat about parody than satire and sarcasm, noting its an-
cient pedigree and service as social commentary. 48 Yet the moniker
"parody" is not alone sufficient for society to celebrate parody. A qual-
ity key to social approval is "decorum," which parody may breach by
mocking a "deeply held public value" such as "veneration for the war
dead."49
B. Three Theories of Humor
Theories for what constitutes humor proliferate. Three long-
standing theories predominate: the superiority, incongruity, and re-
lease theories. 50  Although contemporary humor theorists have
reached beyond the received wisdom of a tripartite structure to hu-
mor,51 the three theories still enjoy mainstream status. Moreover,
while each of the three theories has a separate history, the three often
operate simultaneously, sometimes all explaining the comedy in one
communication. In this subpart, I provide an overview the three theo-
ries and then provide an illustration of their overlap.
44 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 62 (citing J.Y.T. GREic, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAUGH-
TER AND COMEDY 174-98 (1969)).
45 Peggy Zeglin Brand, Parody, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AESTHETICS 441, 442 (Michael
Kelly ed., 1998); see also Palmer, supra note 25, at 81 (referring to this quality as
"intertextuality").
46 Brand, supra note 45 ("Unlike forms of satire or burlesque that do not make their
target a significant part of themselves, parody allows for comedy that laughs 'both at and
with its target.'" (quoting MARGARET A. Rosu, PARODY/META-FICTION: AN ANALYSIS OF PAR-
ODY AS A CRITICAL MIRROR TO THE WRITING AND RECEPTION OF FICTION (1979))).
47 See BERGER, supra note 11, at 74-75 (discussing how parody must play on the "dis-
tinctive identity" of a text).
48 See id. at 75 ("[P]arody is nothing new and parody is one of the most important
techniques utilized by humorists .. ").
49 Palmer, supra note 25, at 93.
50 See, e.g., Friend, supra note 1, at 80, 93 (describing the three different theories and
identifying them as "history's three favorite comedy theories"). Consider the following
encapsulation of the three: "The Renaissance brought Hobbes's superiority theory (laugh-
ter marks the sudden attainment of power over someone else), which gave way first to
Kant's incongruity theory (laughter occurs when perceptions don't conform to logical ex-
pectations), and, finally, to Freud's relief theory (laughter releases pent-up nervous en-
ergy)." Emily Eakin, If It's Funny, You Laugh, but Why?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at B7.
51 See Friend, supra note 1, at 81-82 (discussing more recent theories of humor).
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1. Superiority Theory
The superiority theory arguably enjoys the longest lineage of all,
and is identified with ancient thinkers (Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, and
Cicero) who associated humor with aggression and described it as a
mechanism of disparaging others to enhance one's own sense of well-
being.52 Plato, for example, argued that weak individuals deploy hu-
mor only where they are unlikely to face counterattack. 53 Echoing
this disdainful tone, Socrates admonished that society must tightly
control laughter, particularly laughter that mocks authority as well as
"philosophical notions of truth and beauty. '54
Characteristically, Thomas Hobbes embraced a similarly negative
view and is credited with developing superiority theory itself.55 Hob-
bes focused on human egocentricity and the quest for power, sug-
gesting that individuals find amusement only if a communication or
event prompts them to feel personally successful or if the event gives
them the perception that another appears inferior. 56 In humor litera-
ture's most famous passage, Hobbes states: "Sudden Glory, is the pas-
sion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused
either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison
whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. '5 7 In other words, laugh-
ter for Hobbes is no more than basking in one's victory or superiority
over another. 58
2. Incongruity Theory
As originally developed, incongruity theory rescued humor from
the negative spirit of superiority theory. Identified with Immanuel
Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, incongruity theory suggests that hu-
mor arises from the juxtaposition of two incongruous or inconsistent
52 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 16, at 202-03; see also Chapman & Foot, supra note 22, at
1, 1 (observing that Cicero, Quintilian, and Aristotle believed that laughter has its basis in
"shabbiness or deformity" and is "degrading to morals, art and religion, a form of beha-
viour from which civilized man should shrink"). But cf BILLIG, supra note 28, at 38
("Neither Plato nor Aristotle described their views on humour as 'theories'.").
53 Dolf Zillmann & Joanne R. Cantor, A Disposition Theory of Humour and Mirth, in
HUMOR AND LAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 93, 94 ("Plato made the weak and helpless a
prime target of ridicule and a risk-free source of social gaiety.").
54 BILLIG, supra note 28, at 41-42.
55 See Eakin, supra note 50.
56 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 48 (G.AJ. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann eds., Thoemmes
Continuum 2003) (1651).
57 Id. Hobbes further states that this inclination is common among those who "are
conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their
own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men." Id.




phenomena. 59 Viewed in this way, humor takes on the air of accom-
plishment, joining company with unlikely turns of mind such as artis-
tic creativity and scientific discovery.60 Of the three theories,
incongruity theory is the most complex and perhaps the most
mysterious.
Humorous incongruity can manifest in myriad, seemingly unre-
lated ways. For example, incongruity might result because a commu-
nication suddenly alters perspective or point of view. The alteration
can simply deviate from the information contained in the foundation,
or "setup," for the humor-as in the following joke:
O'Riley was on trial for armed robbery. The jury came out and an-
nounced, "Not guilty." "Wonderful," said O'Riley, "does that mean
I can keep the money?"6 1
The "setup" for this joke suggests that, having been acquitted of
armed robbery, O'Riley would not be inclined to admit to the crime.62
Hence, O'Riley's admission comes as a surprise. Literary theorist
Henri Bergson characterizes this type of incongruity as a form of in-
version where the comic depicts characters in one situation and then
reverses their roles. 63 Classic American examples appear in good-
news/bad-news jokes:
General George Washington at Valley Forge to his troops: "The
good news is that you're going to get a change of underwear. The
bad news is that you have to change it with the man next to you."6 4
59 See Martin, supra note 17, at 203.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 63 (quoting Jerry M. Suls, A Two-Stage Model for the Appreciation of Jokes and
Cartoons: An Information-Processing Analysis, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES 81, 90 (Jeffrey H. Goldstein & Paul E. McGhee eds.,
1972)).
62 Isaac Asimov suggests that humor readily results where the alteration produces "an-
ticlimax." ISAAC ASIMOV, ISAAC ASIMOV'S TREASURY OF HUMOR 4 (1971). Asimov uses the
following as an example:
"Oh, poor Mr. Jones," mourned Mrs. Smith. "Did you hear what happened
to him? He tripped at the top of the stairs, fell down the whole flight,
banged his head, and died."
"Died?" said Mrs. Robinson, shocked.
"Died!" repeated Mrs. Smith with emphasis. "Broke his glasses, too."
Id. at 3. The change in point of view is from tragedy (death) to mere inconvenience (bro-
ken glasses).
63 BERGSON, supra note 12, at 94 ("Picture to yourself certain characters in a certain
situation: if you reverse the situation and invert the r6les, you obtain a comic scene.").
Bergson also describes a similar play, which he calls reciprocal interference of series. "A situa-
tion is invariably comic when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether independent se-
ries of events and is capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the
same time." Id. at 96.
64 JOSEPH BOSKIN, REBELLIOUS LAUGHTER: PEOPLE'S HUMOR IN AMERICAN CULTURE
15-16 (1997) (describing good-news/bad-news jokes as a form of incongruity humor).
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In a similar manner, the information serving as a joke's foundation
might derive from an unstated assumption or perceived reality com-
monly shared in a culture. Take, for example, an assumption that
men should be the aggressors in romantic relationships with women.
For those embracing this assumption, humor may result from depic-
tions of a "domineering woman attacking a submissive man."65 Or the
incongruity might simply result when the familiar is placed in a for-
eign, unfamiliar context.66 Although pioneering his own theory of
humor (discussed below), Freud suggests other mechanisms that cre-
ate incongruity: "the coupling of dissimilar things, contrasting ideas,
'sense in nonsense', [and] the succession of bewilderment and
enlightenment. 67
Although empirically one might conclude that incongruity often
accompanies comedy, this observation does not "[o]n its own ... ex-
plain why the perception of incongruity should be followed by a sense
of pleasure and laughter."68 As one author observes, incongruity is an
"ingredient in such unfunny phenomena as poetic metaphors, magic
tricks, and . . . whodunit thrillers."69
Several explanations for the connection between humor and in-
congruity suggest themselves. First, incongruity is inherently interest-
ing, i.e., intellectually provoking, unusual, and ear catching. In
addition, incongruity is often full of mental action.7 0 For example, an
incongruous line in a joke often prompts the audience to refer back
to the joke's original setup, a process inspiring spontaneous mental
exercise. Take, for example, the following statement by an older
person:
I still have sex at 74. I live at [number] 75, so it's no distance for
me.
7 1
In processing the joke, the audience must double back to the setup "I
still have sex at 74" and reevaluate its significance. 72 Sometimes called
65 Lawrence La Fave et al., Superiority, Enhanced Self-Esteem, and Perceived Incongruity
Humour Theory, in HUMOR AND LAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 63, 84.
66 See BERGSON, supra note 12, at 112 (asserting that "comic meaning is invariably ob-
tained when an absurd idea is fitted into a well-established phrase-form").
67 SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 14 Uames
Strachey ed. & trans., 1960) (1905).
68 BILLIG, supra note 28, at 76.
69 Tony Veale, Incongruity in Humor: Root Cause or Epiphenomenon ?, 17 HUMOR: INT'L
J. HUMOR Rvs. 419, 424 (2004).
70 See id. at 420-21 (describing the process of mental backtracking in response to an
incongruity); see also BILLIG, supra note 28, at 65 (explaining that incongruities "requir[e]
the listener to make an abrupt cognitive reorganization").
71 Veale, supra note 69, at 420 (presenting and analyzing this joke).
72 See id. ("The listener, who is unaware of the ambiguity at first, is thus forced to




a "recoil,' 73 this mental process reflects surprise, unexpected insight,
and sometimes even an emotional roller coaster. As Robert Provine
argues, however, the laughter provoked by the surprise and emotional
tumult is not definitive evidence of humor.7 4 Nonetheless, an audi-
ence's mental cooperation with a humorist-anticipating that the hu-
morist seeks to make them laugh, but unsure of how the humorist will
do so until the punch line arrives-is usually a pleasurable one. 75 In
many cases, pleasure also results from the "good guy wins" tone of
many attempts at humor, which "up-end" perceptions of reality,
thereby creating a hearty challenge to hierarchy and communicating
a form of "justice." 7 6
So far, then, the explanations for why incongruity can produce
humor are intellectual provocation, mental exercise, colorful or ear-
catching contexts, emotional workouts, and social critique. Coming at
the connection between incongruity and humor from another per-
spective, some psychiatrists and psychologists hypothesize that incon-
gruity must combine with another condition for humor to result.77
Examples of necessary conditions include: the incongruity "must oc-
cur suddenly," the incongruity "must take place in a playful and non-
threatening context," or the incongruity must ultimately "be resolved"
or "make sense. ' 78 The following dangling modifier illustrates this lat-
ter proposition:
Because of their sandy bottoms, tourists enjoy New Jersey beaches.
At first blush, one might read this sentence as depicting the New
Jersey vacation scene, describing the fine quality of the New Jersey
shore. The humor arises-at least partially-from the incongruity of
discussing sand-encrusted human buttocks. The joke is complete,
however, only upon realizing the author's grammatical mistake: "be-
cause of their sandy bottoms" is meant to modify "beaches" and not
73 Id.
74 PROVINE, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that most laughter is produced by speak-
ers, not listeners, and typically results from factors other than witticisms).
75 Victor Raskin & Salvatore Attardo, Non-Literalness and Non-Bona Fide in Language: An
Approach to Formal and Computational Treatments of Humor, 2 PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 31,
35-37 (1994) (discussing recoil effect and describing how listeners will "look for the neces-
sary ingredients of the joke in the speaker's utterance"); see Ewick & Silbey, supra note 3, at
561 (explaining that because humor often places two or more disparate elements in com-
petition, humor enjoys a "quality of suspense").
76 See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 3, at 561.
77 See MARTIN, supra note 17, at 64 (noting that not all incongruities are humorous
and discussing what is necessary to make an incongruity humorous).
78 Id. at 64-65 (surveying various theories). Independent humor theories also share
these observations. For example, two theories related to incongruity theory are the sur-
prise theory of humor, which focuses on "sudden, unexpected positive events" and the
ambivalence theory, which focuses on simultaneously occurring, yet inconsistent, emo-
tions. LEON RAPPOPORT, PUNCHLINES: THE CASE FOR RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND GENDER HUMOR
17-18 (2005).
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"tourists. '79 Of course, Sigmund Freud might explain the humor here
by pointing to the allusion to a naked, intimate body part.80 To that
theory I now turn.
3. Release Theory
According to release theory, humor taps into repressed sources of
pleasure, 8' pressure, 82 or anxiety.83 Thus, a communication's funny
quality arises because it induces laughter and, with it, a release of re-
pressions. Sometimes called "relief theory," release theory is most
often identified with Sigmund Freud and English philosophers Alex-
ander Bain and Herbert Spencer.84 Bain and Spencer focused on the
quality of humor provoking a "release of nervous energy."85 As Bain
explained, humor's embrace of "degradation" or its celebration of
mischief prompted this release. 86
Freud embossed this energy release notion onto his view that
jokes express taboo desires. 87 He likened jokes to dreams-both of
which work by analogy or allusion, defeating logic and actual meaning
to elude the human inner censor.8 8 His joke theory distinguishes be-
tween a "non-tendentious" (or innocent) and a "tendentious" joke.8 9
For Freud, a non-tendentious joke is an "aim in itself' and generally
achieves only a "slight smile," while a tendentious joke is either "hos-
tile," "cynical," "s[k]eptical," or "obscene."90  By obscene, Freud
79 See MARTIN, supra note 17, at 65, which provides a similar explanation for the fol-
lowing joke:
An English bishop received the following note from the vicar of a village in
his diocese: "Milord, I regret to inform you of my wife's death. Can you
possibly send me a substitute for the weekend?"
Id. (quoting VICTOR RASKIN, SEMANTIC MECHANISMS OF HUMOR 106 (1985)).
80 FREUD, supra note 67, at 98 ("By the utterance of the obscene words it compels the
person who is assailed to imagine the part of the body.., in question .....
81 See id. at 95.
82 BILLIC, supra note 28, at 86.
83 JOHN LIMON, STAND-UP COMEDY IN THEORY, OR, ABJECTION IN AMERICA 39 (2000)
(observing that a joke can release anxiety and fear about such matters as miscegenation
and homoeroticism).
84 See, e.g., BILLIG, supra note 28, at 86 (tracing release theory to a dispute between
Bain and Spencer); MuRRAv S. DAVIS, WHAT'S SO FUNNY?: THE COMIC CONCEPTION OF CUL-
TURE AND SOCIETY 7 (1993) (naming Freud and Spencer as the founders of the release
theory).
85 BILLIG, supra note 28, at 91.
86 Id. at 95-98.
87 FREUD, supra note 67, at 101.
88 See id. at 107 (drawing a similarity between the way dreams and jokes mask underly-
ing thoughts).
89 Id. at 94.
90 Id. at 96-97, 115. Freud also explored a similar distinction between harmless wit
and tendency wit. See id. at 90-116. According to this distinction, harmless wit (analogous
to non-tendentious humor) simply uses cleverness to amuse. Tendency wit (aligned with
tendentious humor) seeks to achieve other purposes, such as to ridicule some person,
group, or thing. Id.; see also Charles R. Gruner, Wit and Humour in Mass Communication, in
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meant ajoke exposing "sexual facts and relations."9' The other three
categories-hostile, cynical, and skeptical-are more general in sub-
ject matter. According to Freud, hostile jokes tend to focus on partic-
ular persons and can be overtly aggressive, defensive, or designed to
enlist a third person against an enemy.9 2 Cynical jokes have similar
effects yet focus criticism on institutions, "morality or religion," or
well-established life views. 93 While similar to cynical and hostile jokes,
skeptical jokes do not attack persons, institutions, or belief systems.
Rather, skeptical jokes challenge something core to human exis-
tence-"the certainty of our knowledge itself."94
Having identified these various categories, Freud nonetheless rec-
ognized that the purpose or subject matter of tendentious jokes does
not alone create humor and identified other characteristics necessary
to render a communication funny.95 In creating this taxonomy of hu-
morous characteristics, his approach resembles incongruity theory,
citing techniques such as coupling unlikely phenomena 96 and making
use of "faulty," nonsensical, or absurd thinking.9 7 As in all aspects of
his work, Freud's humor theory influenced other scholars enor-
mously. His notion that jokes serve as a vehicle for release, however,
has had the greatest lasting impact. In fact, scholars have expanded
the idea thatjokes release sexual tensions into other taboo or sensitive
subjects, such as excretion and death.9 8 Similarly, contemporary theo-
ries observing humor's role in venting existential angst also reflect his
thinking on skeptical humor.99
HUMOR AND LAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 287, 288 (describing the dichotomy between
harmless wit and tendency wit).
91 FREUD, supra note 67, at 97.
92 Id. at 96-97, 115.
93 Id. at 108-09.
94 Id. at 115. As an example of this last category, Freud cites the following example:
Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia. "Where are you
going?" asked one. "To Cracow", was the answer. "What a liar you are!"
broke out the other. "If you say you're going to Cracow, you want me to
believe you're going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you're going to
Cracow. So why are you lying to me?"
Id. at 115.
95 Id. at 117.
96 See, e.g., id. at 120.
97 Id. at 124-27. Of course, Freud observed other techniques with no apparent rela-
tion to incongruity, such as "brevity" and repetition of sound and concepts. Id. at 14, 122.
For other citations to these techniques, see BEROSON, supra note 12, at 72-76, 90-93 (not-
ing that repetition is a key feature of comedy, whether it be words or circumstances); WiL-
LIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, sc. 2 ("Therefore, since brevity is the
soul of wit, / And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes, I will be brief .... .").
98 See, e.g., Vassilis Saroglou & Lydwine Anciaux, Liking Sick Humor: Coping Styles and
Religion as Predictors, 17 HUMOR: IN T'LJ. HUMOR REs. 257, 257, 266 (2004) (presenting
study demonstrating that appreciation of jokes about death, disease, deformity, and dis-
abled persons is positively related to coping styles).
99 Consider the following:
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4. The Three Theories Work Together
Each of the three humor theories possesses a distinct analytical
heritage. The three are not, however, mutually exclusive; one can eas-
ily combine them in analyzing the source of the "funny" in a particu-
lar communication. Some humor theorists have even tried to develop
a synthesized framework, which attempts to integrate two or more of
the main theories into one framework.' 0 0 More common are those
analysts who do not attempt to splice the theories together but none-
theless find use for each in explaining one communication. For ex-
ample, literary theorists dissecting Mark Twain's writings have found
in them the release of "the repressed tension imposed by civilization's
ideals,"' 0 ' an attempt "to reveal incongruities ... inherent in life and
in oneself,"' 0 2 and social commentary, infused with defiance and dis-
dain for others. 10 3 Similarly, British scientist Richard Wiseman, who
conducted an Internet humor study, used the following joke to illus-
trate how the theories can operate simultaneously:
Two hunters are out in the woods when one of them collapses. He
doesn't seem to be breathing and his eyes are glazed. The other
guy whips out his phone and calls the emergency services. He
gasps, "My friend is dead! What can I do?". The operator says
"Calm down. I can help. First, let's make sure he's dead." There is
a silence, then a shot is heard. Back on the phone, the guy says
"OK, now what?'
0 4
Despite our wish to separate the humor from the nihilism and see it as a
redemptive impulse in a world becoming meaningless, couldn't it be possi-
ble that humor, and the responsive laughter it both needs and provokes, is
itself the very essence of nihilism. Far from being separate from nihilism,
the responsive laughter is an abrupt physical release of the repressed ten-
sion imposed by civilization's ideals-a release made possible by the humor-
ist's exposure of the absence of meaning in existence.
JAMES M. Cox, Introduction to the 2002 Edition of MARK TWAIN: THE FATE OF HUMOR, at xv
(Univ. of Mo. Press 2002) (1966).
100 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 84, at 7 (explaining how the three theories supplement
one another in explaining how humor is perceived, expressed, and felt); La Fave et al.,
supra note 65, at 89 (synthesizing superiority and incongruity theories).
101 Cox, supra note 99.
102 DON FLORENCE, PERSONA AND HUMOR IN MARK TWAIN'S EARLY WRITINGS 11 (1995).
103 See, e.g.,James M. Cox, Yankee Slang, in MARK TWAIN'S HUMOR: CRITICAL ESSAYS 271,
274 (David E.E. Sloane ed., 1993) (describing Twain's preface in Huckleberry Finn as "defi-
ant and nihilistic"); Shelley Fisher Fishkin, "The Tales He Couldn't Tell," in MARK TWAIN'S
HUMOR, supra, at 359, 374 (describing vehicles Twain used to expose society's "absurd"
assumptions); Clyde Grimm, The American Claimant: Reclamation of a Farce, in MARK
TWAIN'S HUMOR, supra, at 313, 318 (describing Twain's work in The American Claimant as
transforming the story from "meaningless farce into thoroughgoing political and social
satire").
104 LaughLab.co.uk, http://www.laughlab.co.uk/ (follow "The winning joke" hyper-




Identifying this as the "world's funniestjoke," Wiseman maintains that
the joke supports the three theories because the listener and joke
teller feel superior to the stupid hunter, the hunter's misunderstand-
ing of the operator is incongruous, and the joke enables laughter
about an uncomfortable subject, death. 105
Unlike this joke, the case law examples analyzed below illustrate
that-sometimes-an integrated joke or parody does not parse natu-
rally into distinct humor categories.10 6 Nonetheless, the three catego-
ries of humor remain useful heuristics for analyzing whether courts
privilege certain types of humor over others.
C. The Normative Judgment of Nonlegal Thinkers: How Does
Humor Fare?
Contemporary nonlegal humor scholarship is rich and thus re-
sists distillation. Generally, however, humor-and its beneficial role
in society-receives wide praise. Scholars' negative judgments tend to
focus on superiority and release humor.10 7 With some exceptions, so-
cial scientists, natural scientists, and humanities scholars find the
greatest value in incongruity humor, mixed value in release humor,
and frequent problems with superiority humor.'0 8 Evidence of ag-
gressive superiority often spawns criticism, although scholars some-
times find a double-edged character to humor that at first blush might
appear overwhelmingly positive or negative. 10 9
Consequentialism characterizes contemporary normative analysis
of humor."10 And the catalogue of positive consequences is particu-
larly broad. For individual well-being, scholars have identified humor
as a potent coping device, which affords an "alternate perspective" to
105 LaughLab.co.uk, supra note 104 (explaining that the joke has universal appeal
across nationalities, genders, and ages); see also Friend, supra note 1, at 93 (reporting on
Wiseman's analysis).
106 See infra Part II.
107 See, e.g., Kuiper et al., supra note 20, at 139-41 (describing research addressing both
the positive and negative dimensions of humor).
108 See, e.g., BILLIG, supra note 28, at 57-85 (describing the historical, sociological, and
philosophical connections between incongruity humor on one hand and high social rank,
education, and "gentlemanly laughter" on the other hand); id. at 158-68 (explaining both
salutary benefits and dangers that Freud identified in "tendentious" humor concerning
taboo topics such as sex and ethnicity); Kuiper et al., supra note 20, at 139-41 (describing
psychological analysis of humor based on superiority, which tends to be "boorish," based
on a "mean-spirited and sarcastic style of poking fun at others," and "maladaptive");
Zillmann & Cantor, supra note 53, at 93-94 (describing various philosophers' negative
views of superiority humor, which is thought to reflect a "shallow morality" and "satanic
spirit" in humans). See also infra notes 126-44 and accompanying text for ftirther discus-
sion of relevant authorities.
109 See, e.g., ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 143-44 (reviewing different approaches to
superiority theory).
110 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 16, at 203-04 (noting the increase of research on the
psychological and physical benefits of humor and laughter).
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persons confronting situations fraught with fear, sadness, or anger.I l'
This alternate perspective allows us to embrace our limitations, 112 to
become indifferent to them,11 3 or to conquer them. 11 4 As such, hu-
mor can transform the bad (human limitations) into the good
(human strengths). Comedians are deemed to possess special trans-
formative skills upon encountering tragedy, as they "are highly moti-
vated to negate it and transmute it into something pleasant and
funny.""15 In this regard, humor can moderate stress because hu-
mor's new perspective encourages people to cast a congenial light on
stressful situations. Similarly, pleasurable emotions associated with
humor may reduce stress-related emotions and accompanying physio-
logical changes."16
A large measure of humor's positive consequences is thought to
derive from its social nature. Humor assists with stress management
in part because it enhances human relationships. How does it do this?
Humor makes us feel as though "we are part of the [humorist's] intel-
lectual in-crowd, and generally [puts] us in a good mood, ... make [s]
us feel good about ourselves . . . [and mitigates] our defenses."' 17 In-
terestingly, humor is most effective where parties share the back-
ground for a joke. The shared knowledge creates intimacy between
the joke teller and the listener, thereby enhancing the humor."l 8 For
this reason, analysts posit that preexisting shared knowledge of the
object of parody is necessary for true parody to succeed." 9
This notion of shared intimacy may explain scholars' general
preference for incongruity humor. In order for parties to a joke to
appreciate the incongruity emerging from the joke's juxtaposition of
two phenomena, the parties need shared knowledge of what likely
"' Id. at 203.
112 See COHEN, supra note 25, at 41 ("When we laugh at a true absurdity, we simultane-
ously confess that we cannot make sense of it and that we accept it. Thus this laughter is an
expression of our humanity, our finite capacity, our ability to live with what we cannot
understand or subdue.").
113 See BERGSON, supra note 12, at 5 (observing that when we "look upon life as a disin-
terested spectator[,] many a drama will turn into a comedy").
114 See COHEN, supra note 25, at 40 ("Humor in general and jokes in particular are
among the most typical and reliable resources we have for meeting . devastating and
incomprehensible matters.").
115 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 58.
116 Martin, supra note 16, at 203.
117 Katrina Triezenberg, Humor Enhancers in the Study of Humorous Literature, 17 HU-
MOR: INT'LJ. HUMOR RES. 411, 413 (2004).
118 COHEN, supra note 25, at 28 (explaining that a shared background of understand-
ing "is the foundation of the intimacy that will develop if your joke succeeds, and the
hearer then also joins you in a shared response to the joke").
119 See, e.g., ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 62 (noting that parody loses its "effect when
the original, or object of attack, is not well known" (citing GREIG, supra note 44, at
174-98)); Palmer, supra note 25, at 81-82 (noting that parody operates where actual text
serving as the object of the parody and parody itself have sufficient overlap).
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pairings the phenomena usually enjoy.120 Thus, incongruity humor
builds on and reinforces the parties' connection to each other by ac-
knowledging their shared understanding.
Despite the impressive catalogue of humor's beneficial conse-
quences, empirical studies identify unexpected limitations. Studies
are equivocal on the persuasive value of humor12' as well as its link to
good health. Within the humor literature, received wisdom has long
assumed a link between humor and good physical health. 922 Scholars
propose many reasons for this link: physiological changes in the body
that accompany laughter, increases in "the positive emotional states
accompanying humor and laughter," decreases in the "adverse effects
of psychosocial stress on health," and an increase in "social support,"
by reducing conflicts and enhancing positive feelings in others. 123
While these hypotheses are intuitively appealing, actual empirical sup-
port for the link between humor and health could be stronger. 24
Promising evidence does, however, firmly document one positive
physical effect of humor: increased pain tolerance. 125
Several thinkers studying the link between humor and well-being
differentiate between humor styles that are beneficial and those that
are detrimental to well-being.' 26 These studies tend to invoke superi-
ority theory in analyzing negative, maladaptive humor styles. 127 Mal-
adaptive styles contrast with positive, socially adaptive styles of humor,
which can generate an amused response from others and build affilia-
tions among persons but nonetheless enhance the humorist's status
(although not at the expense of others). 28 Maladaptive humor, on
the other hand, tends to be self-defeating, belabored, aggressive, or
impolite. 129 One recent study concluded that humor with adaptive
120 See COHEN, supra note 25.
121 See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 90, at 289, 301 (noting a general lack of support for
humor's persuasive effect as well as more specific conclusions that might be drawn regard-
ing satire).
122 See Rod A. Martin, Sense of Humor and Physical Health: Theoretical Issues, Recent Find-
ings, and Future Directions, 17 HUMOR: INT'LJ. HUMOR RES. 1, 1-2, 14 (2004).
123 Id. at 4, 5.
124 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Kuiper & Sorrel Nicholl, Thoughts of Feeling Better?: Sense of
Humor and Physical Health, 17 HUMOR: INT'LJ. HUMOR RES. 37, 38 (2004) (reporting that
empirical evidence is "surprisingly weak" for hypothesis that a greater sense of humor is
linked to better health).
125 See Karen Zweyer et al., Do Cheerfulness, Exhilaration, and Humor Production Moderate
Pain Tolerance?: A FACS Study, 17 HUMOR: Ir'LJ. HUMOR RES. 85, 86-92 (2004) (describ-
ing past literature on correlation and reporting results of study in which pain tolerance
increased after watching a "humorous film").
126 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 122, at 14 (describing a "multidimensional approach to
sense of humor, distinguishing between aspects of humor that are potentially beneficial to
well-being and those that are potentially detrimental").
127 Kuiper et al., supra note 20, at 139-41.
128 Id. at 135, 140-41.
129 Id.
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components was associated with "greater self-esteem, lower depression
and anxiety levels, and more positive self-competency judgments. '"1 30
Maladaptive humor correlated with negative psychological effects
such as greater depression and anxiety.131
Both maladaptive humor and adaptive humor reinforce them-
selves through feedback loops: empirical studies suggest that exposure
to nonhostile humor reduces subsequent aggression by previously an-
gered individuals, whereas exposure to hostile humor actually en-
hances aggressive behavior.1 32 Individuals can be deceived, however,
because disparagement humor camouflages the hostility or Schaden-
freude one might experience upon observing ill luck befall an individ-
ual whom one dislikes. 33 Additional studies introduce further
nuance to this binary adaptive/maladaptive formula. For example,
several thinkers have observed that apparently negative humor can
have positive consequences because aggressive and sarcastic humor,
while damaging "one's relationships and potential social support," can
relieve one's own tension and stress. 134 Along similar lines, superior-
ity humor might benefit the self-esteem of those portrayed in the su-
perior position.13 5
Negative humor can have similarly double-edged consequences
for groups. On one hand, a "common history of word play" can estab-
lish group identity.' 36 Even negative humor-humor based on a
group's superiority-can help establish group solidarity and reinforce
cohesion. Of course, non-group members can suffer because "group
boundaries may... be erected and patrolled by 'humorously' degrad-
ing those who are outside.' 37 Humor integrates and alienates seg-
ments of society in other ways as well. Not only can humor enable
community members to resolve social tensions through humorous
130 Id. at 135. Interestingly, one study showed a correlation between a strong capacity
to cope with stress through emotional expression (such as emotional support, venting, and
social support) and an appreciation of "sick humor" (defined as humor that "makes fun of
death, disease, deformity, and the handicapped"). Saroglou & Anciaux, supra note 98, at
257, 266.
131 Kuiper et al., supra note 20, at 135-36, 160-62.
132 Robert A. Baron, Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of Sexual Humor, 36J. PERsONALrrv &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1978) (reporting the results of experiments investigating the exis-
tence of a possible link between humor and aggression).
133 Dolf Zillmann & Jennings Bryant, Misattribution Theory of Tendentious Humor, 16 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 150 (1980).
134 Martin, supra note 122, at 16 (discussing hypothesized mechanisms for the link
between humor and health); see also FREUD, supra note 67, at 102-03 (explaining that hos-
tile humor can allow the humorist to release emotional tension and to purge hostile
impulses).
135 La Fave et al., supra note 65, at 87.
136 Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Every-





"collaborative activities,"' 13s but it can also disrupt a community's so-
cial organizations "by giving voice [to the community's] inconsisten-
cies and irrationalities."'139
Humor's two-sided nature has important ramifications for group
politics that implicate stereotypes, discrimination, and dynamics be-
tween insiders and outsiders. In its most nefarious form, humor en-
ables a humorist to indulge in superiority by degrading a group
through racial, gender, or ethnicjokes. The reinforced sense of supe-
riority may in turn foster the humorist's belief that she is acting "with
impunity."' 40 Yet social scientists argue that the functions of group
humor are complex; scholars have reached no consensus on whether
it enhances prejudice. 141 Many observe that racial, gender, and eth-
nic humor helps groups manage problems of role, power, and con-
flict. 142 As in other areas where humor provides a vehicle for
releasing tensions related to taboo subjects, humor also allows differ-
ent groups to explore racial and gender differences without necessa-
rily being hostile. Artfully deployed, humor can even serve "to release
the pressure of inhibition" while leaving in place the inhibition's func-
tion "in non-comic circumstances.' 143 And finally, humor provides an
important weapon for subordinate groups fighting social
oppression.144
Given that law operates as an instrument of power, these observa-
tions about humor and group politics are particularly crucial for
thoughtfully negotiating legal battles. Whether by conscious choice
or intuition, courts frequently show sensitivity to these observations in
deploying legal rules. To these legal examples I now turn.
II
REGULATING FUNNY: CONTRACT, TRADEMARK,
AND DISCRIMINATION LAw
I review here a sample of civil disputes concerning humorous (or
putatively humorous) communications. This Part surveys three dra-
matically different legal areas: contract, trademark, and sexual harass-
138 MICHAEL MULKAY, ON HUMOUR: ITS NATURE AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 153
(1988) (discussing the correspondence between humor and social structure).
139 Id.
140 ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 22 (quoting RAYMONDJ. CORSINI, THE DICTIONARY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 456 (1999)).
141 See, e.g., BoS.IN, supra note 64, at 38 (observing that humor can both "reinforce
pejorative images" and "facilitate[ ] the inversion of such stereotypes").
142 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 25, at 44 (noting that the oppressed commonly make
jokes about their oppressors); Charles Winick, The Social Contexts of Humor, 26J. COMM. 124,
127-128 (1976) (observing how humor can assist groups in managing power conflicts),
cited in ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 68.
143 JERRY PALMER, TAKING HUMOUR SERIOUSLY 61 (1994).
144 See BOSKIN, supra note 64, at 39 (analyzing rebellious humor).
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ment in employment. I chose these areas as representative legal
categories, derived from separate pillars of civil law: contract, property
(represented by trademark infringement and dilution), and tort (rep-
resented-albeit roughly-by sexual harassment) .145 The three cate-
gories also illustrate legal principles derived from varying
governmental power structures in American jurisprudence. Contract
law exemplifies a largely common law subject, while trademark and
sexual harassment have substantial statutory frameworks that inform
their content. All three areas touch the lives of a diverse assortment
of ordinary citizens, yet many cases also implicate large-scale business
interests. Moreover, the three areas derive from diverse sources of
authority. I use contract law to represent state law. Sexual harassment
and trademark laws have mongrel characters, but I nonetheless em-
phasize their federal law origins by reporting primarily on federal
cases. Finally, all three provide a mixture of private and public law
principles.
Despite differences among these legal categories, all three show
similar attitudes toward humor. Most prominently, all three reflect
the law's tendency to step aside where incongruity forms the founda-
tion for a humorous communication. Trademark and sexual harass-
ment litigation also heavily regulate humor based on the superiority
of one group (or person) over another and humor focusing on a ta-
boo subject matter associated with "release" humor. In tracing these
patterns, I start with contract cases before turning to trademark and
sexual harassment cases.
A. The Law Steps Aside: Contract
1. Joke Versus Contract
Standard doctrine in contract law holds that a "contract is an obli-
gation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties,
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known in-
tent."1 4 6 In evaluating the operative acts, the law employs an objective
standard, assessing "the reasonable meaning of... words and acts" to
145 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination awards under
Title VII are not tort remedies for the purpose of the federal tax code. United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1992) (concluding that back pay remedies for gender-biased
salary schedules are not "damages received.., on account of personal injuries" under the
tax code). Some have argued, however, that this specific holding was fashioned only for
interpreting the role of economic damages in the tax code and does not undermine the
connection between dignitary harms of sexual harassment and tort laws. See id. at 254
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Title VII offers a tort-like cause of action to those who suffer
the injury of employment discrimination."); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment
with Respect, III HARv. L. Rxv. 445, 451 n.39, 510 n.394 (1997) (advocating the position
that employment discrimination offers important tort analogies and noting the narrow
reach of the Burke holding).
146 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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determine whether they "manifest an intention to agree."1 47 Thus, it
is the "appearance of intent that matters most."'148 In the context of
humor, this means that "a person cannot set up that he was merely
jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable per-
son in believing that he intended a real agreement."'149
How does a court make this evaluation aboutjest? The cases pro-
vide little guidance, leading one first to conclude that a "gut check"
provides the relevant inquiry. In the analysis that does appear, courts
focus on whether the parties' actions are congruent with the conclu-
sion that they intended to form a contract. If, upon analysis, the court
finds a disconnect between the two (the parties' actions and their con-
tractual intentions), then the court generally holds that the parties
did not form a contract. Thus, the court in essence embosses humor
theorists' incongruity theory on the litigation facts to test for the exis-
tence of a contract. If the incongruity test exposes humor, then the
court is more likely to refuse contractual obligation.
Joke versus contract disputes have a long lineage. At one time,
suits often arose in the context of sham marriages. 150 Conflict contin-
ues to occur frequently as part of advertised contests.1 51 Although sev-
eral high-visibility cases settled out of court,152 reported decisions
indubitably influence these settlements and have had a significant im-
pact on the study of and debate on contracts doctrine.' 53
147 Luebbert v. Simmons, 98 S.W.3d 72, 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Lucy v.
Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954)).
148 Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 354 (2007)
(criticizing the objective approach to contract formation).
149 Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522.
150 See, e.g., Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 880-82 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(surveying sham-marriage case law), affid, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971); A. Della Porta,
Annotation, Validity of Marriage as Affected by Intention of the Parties That It Should Be Only a
Matter of Form or Jest, 14 A.L.R.2d 624 (1950).
151 See. e.g., Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (deciding a
dispute over alleged offer to provide fighter jet in return for Pepsi Points); Graves v. N.
N.Y. Publ'g Co., 22 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (deciding dispute over alleged offer
to the person who would provide the newspaper with the phone number of Western
Union); Barnes v. Treece, 549 P.2d 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (deciding dispute sur-
rounding public offer by officer of a punchboard corporation to reward anyone who finds
a "crooked" punchboard).
152 In one case, Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings, Inc., No. 01-2642 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed July 24,
2001), a Hooters waitress apparently encountered success in settling a case in which her
supervisor offered a "Toyota" to the person who sold the most beer but then offered only a
doll of the Star Wars character Yoda (a "toy Yoda") to the best performing waitress. Keith
A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It... Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, and Contract Law, 3
NEV. L.J. 526, 527 (2003) (summarizing Berry). In another recent dispute not yet resolved
on the merits, two radio listeners sued a rock station after being denied an announced
cash prize for permanently tattooing the station's logo on their foreheads. See id. at 559.
153 See Rowley, supra note 152, at 526 n.2, 527 n.7 (noting how Berry sparked a lively
debate on a contract professors' Listserv and that Lucy consistently appears in contracts
case books).
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Four reported decisions illustrate particularly well how courts rely
on their own form of incongruity theory in evaluating claims of en-
forceable contract. First, in Lucy v. Zehmer,154 the court enforced an
allegedly comedic exchange between the parties, basing its conclusion
that no joke existed on the congruence between the parties' actions
and the existence of a real agreement. Finding "persuasive evidence
that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction
rather than a casual, jesting matter," the court cited the parties' ex-
tended discussion over the contract, one party's objection to gram-
matical specifics in the document, the insistence that it be signed by
husband and wife, and the detailed terms established.1 55 This ap-
proach of evaluating the consistency between the parties' actions and
those expected in a real contract is mirrored in McKinzie v. Stretch.15 6
There, the court reasoned that one party's "codding" that he got the
best of a bargain was "not such an unusual or inconsistent thing as
should discredit the allegation of a bargain in fact." 15 7
Similar reference to society's expectations of the usual scope of
contract obligations appeared in the (otherwise very unusual) deci-
sion in Woo v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 158 In that case, an oral
surgeon (Dr. Woo) operating on an anesthetized employee tempora-
rily implanted fake boar tusks in the employee's mouth, propped the
employee's eyes open, photographed her, and subsequently shared
the photographs with others in the office. 159 The employee sued, and
Dr. Woo's liability insurance carrier refused to cover the suit. 160 Find-
ing that Dr. Woo's actions were sufficiently consistent with his role as a
dental surgeon as to fall within the scope of the liability policy, the
Washington Supreme Court invoked its own common sense notions
of congruity and consistency.1 61 According to the court, Dr. Woo's
attempt at humor was adequately "integrated into and inseparable
from" dental procedure as to be covered by the insurance contract.1 62
An even clearer example of incongruity analysis in a contract de-
cision is Leonard v. PepsiCo,163 which concerned a promotional cam-
154 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
155 Id. at 521.
156 53 Ill. App. 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1893).
157 Id. at 184, 185.
158 164 P.3d 454 (Wash. 2007).
159 Id. at 457.
160 Id. at 458.
161 Id. at 461.
162 Id. Because Woo arises in the unique context of an insurance contract, it differs
from the other examples because the court's finding that contract principles apply has the
effect of actually protecting the challenged humor. The Washington Supreme Court's ap-
proach, however, is consistent with the other cases because the court implicitly arrived at
congruity analysis in ascertaining whether contractual principles applied.
163 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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paign encouraging consumers to collect "Pepsi Points" and redeem
them for merchandise. As part of the campaign, PepsiCo ran a televi-
sion commercial suggesting one could redeem Pepsi Points for a Har-
rier Jet. The commercial ends with a teenager emerging from a trip
to school in a Harrier Jet, exclaiming, "Sure beats the bus." 164 Next,
the words appear: "HARRIER FIGHTER 7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS"
followed by "Drink Pepsi-Get Stuff."1
65
The plaintiff resolved to obtain the jet, deciding to raise the
money needed to buy the requisite number of Pepsi points. Amaz-
ingly, he somehow succeeded in raising significant funds, presenting
PepsiCo with a check for $700,008.50 and fifteen actual Pepsi
Points. 166 When Pepsi refused to produce the jet, the plaintiff sued.
In evaluating the plaintiffs insistence that the commercial was a seri-
ous offer, the court acknowledged that it needed to "explain why the
commercial is funny"167 and hence not a legally enforceable offer. To
that end, the court canvassed the commercial for incongruities, find-
ing many: the suggestion that Pepsi merchandise can inject the drama
of "military and espionage thrillers" into otherwise "unexceptional
lives," the "highly improbable pilot" in the form of a teenager who
"could barely be trusted with the keys to his parents' car," the "exag-
gerated adolescent fantasy" reflected in "traveling to school in a Har-
rier Jet," the mismatch between school transportation and a piece of
military equipment designed to "attack and destroy surface targets,"
and the improbability that one could actually "drink 7,000,000 Pepsis
(or roughly 190 Pepsis a day for the next hundred years . .. )."168
2. Incongruity's Relationship to Contract Doctrine
In these wildly different contexts from varying times, the courts
invoked remarkably consistent references to incongruity in evaluating
whether to attach contract liability. But the precise legal inquiry-did
the defendant intend to be bound by contract?-does not require re-
sort to incongruity theory rather than other approaches to humor.
For example, the court could analyze the defendant's intent by refer-
ence to whether he was trying to assert superiority by making fun of
the plaintiff. Or the court could evaluate whether the defendant's ac-
tions could be explained by some attempt to release anxiety or hostil-
ity toward the plaintiff in the form of a jest.
Why do the courts favor incongruity theory? One might hypothe-
size that the courts instinctively perceived that incongruity notions are
164 Id. at 119.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 128.
168 Id. at 128-29.
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most consistent with contract law's preference for objective rather
than subjective evidence of intent; my theory here is that incon-
gruity-the unlikelihood of a phenomenon-might be based more
on collective social judgments than on individual subjective judg-
ments. Yet an objective approach to intent would not have prevented
courts from evaluating the defendant's outward manifestations for
signs of ridicule or chiding that are consistent with commonly known
kinds of release or superiority humor and inconsistent with an intent
to be bound by contractual obligation. 169 The absence of this type of
discussion in the contracts cases is notable. I conclude, therefore, that
the courts privileged incongruity theory over release or superiority hu-
mor for reasons that are not wholly explained by contract doctrine.
Contract law's consistent reference to incongruity is not perfectly
reproduced in the case law concerning trademark and sexual harass-
ment analyzed below. That is not to say, however, that decisions reck-
oning with whether trademark or sexual harassment laws should
regulate allegedly funny communications do not reflect incongruity
theory. 170 Moreover, both trademark and sexual harassment laws ac-
tively discourage release and superiority theory, thereby indirectly pre-
ferring humor based on incongruity. 17 1
B. The Law Steps Aside Only Sometimes: Trademark
Plaintiffs claiming interference with an intellectual property right
protected by trademark law use several legal theories to establish lia-
bility. Humor regulation commonly occurs in suits pursuing two theo-
ries: trademark infringement and trademark dilution. As with
contract claims, courts adjudicating infringement and dilution claims
tend to evaluate whether attempted humor is sufficiently successful as
to remove the claim from legal liability. Courts accord privileged
treatment to humor based on incongruity in infringement cases. 72 In
both infringement and dilution litigation cases, courts show enhanced
readiness to regulate release and superiority humor, although the
case law is unpredictable. 1 73 Interestingly, in both the infringement
and dilution contexts, courts honor the tendency of American culture
to treasure parody. This parody protection often evinces tolerance for
superiority humor based on ridicule. 174 Relatively strict requirements,
169 In fact, in McKinzie v. Stretch, 53 Ill. App. 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1893), the court actually
rejected an opportunity to use release or superiority analysis when it evaluated one party's
codding" of another, not as signs of a joke, but as evidence of contractual intent.
170 See infra subparts II.B., II.C.
171 See infta subparts II.B., II.C.
172 See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
173 See infta notes 219-24, 239-42 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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however, circumscribe this tolerance, requirements that protect that
quality of parody yoked to notions of incongruity. 175
1. Trademark Infringement
Registered trademark holders may bring federal statutory claims
for infringement of a registered mark. 176 Although owners of unregis-
tered marks must avail themselves of state common law in pursuing an
infringement action, the relief available is usually the same as in fed-
eral actions, as the principles governing the state and federal infringe-
ment theories are "substantially congruent."1 77
Trademark infringement causes of action are designed to protect
against harm both to consumers who may be misled into buying some-
thing they did not expect and to trademark owners who are deprived
of sales. 78 Key to the cause of action is consumer confusion about the
source of the defendant's goods; specifically, courts evaluate the "like-
lihood of confusion" between the product protected by a trademark
and the challenged product or communication. 179 A humor question
arises where the alleged infringer claims that the purported infringe-
ment is actually a parody of the protected mark.
In evaluating the infringement issue, courts usually invoke incon-
gruity analysis in order to evaluate the humorous quality of the chal-
lenged product or communication. 180 Indeed, in the abstract, the
very nature of the "likelihood of confusion" test dovetails with the con-
cept of incongruity. If the alleged infringement is congruent with a
reasonable interpretation of the qualities or purposes of the protected
product, then a consumer may confuse the two. If, on the other
hand, the connection between the alleged infringement and the pro-
tected product is too outlandish, unexpected, or implausible, then a
consumer would not reasonably confuse the two. As one treatise ex-
plains: when the challenged product amounts to a true parody, an
175 See, e.g., infra note 221 and accompanying text.
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
177 Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir.
1980); see also TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that similarities between state and federal trademark infringement claims made a
magistrate's failure to specify a basis for her decision understandable); Mytee Prods., Inc. v.
H.D. Prods., Inc., No. 05CV2286 R(CAB), 2007 WAL 1813765, at *8 (S.D. Cal.Jun. 22, 2007)
(analyzing only the plaintiff's federal trademark claim and finding summaryjudgment in-
appropriate for substantially similar federal and state claims). The federal Lanham Act
also provides an unfair competition cause of action for holders of unregistered marks. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2006).
178 See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 29.1, at 637 (2003). Trademark protection de-
rives from federal law (primarily the Lanham Act) and state law antidilution statutes. Id.
§ 29, at 636, § 30.5, at 718.
179 Id. § 29.1, at 637.
180 See infra notes 189-238 and accompanying text.
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infringement cause of action will not succeed because "consumers au-
tomatically understand that trademark owners rarely will make fun of
themselves or license others to do so."181 In other words, consumers
understand that it would be incongruous for the profit-maximizing pro-
ducer of a protected product to undercut the product.
A defendant generally asserts a parody defense to establish that
consumers would not likely confuse the protected product with the
challenged product or communication.1 8 2 This argument may have
force beyond simply negating an element of the plaintiffs claim, how-
ever, because of the solicitude accorded to parody under First Amend-
ment case law.' 83 This respect is most potent where the parody
expresses messages implicating core First Amendment values, such as
political and other noncommercial speech. 18 4 Yet courts have deter-
mined that defendants enjoy First Amendment protection well be-
yond traditional political contexts: commercial speech can be
protected, 8 5 and a defendant may enjoy First Amendment protection
by asserting that a trademark (such as "Barbie") has a significant cul-
tural role or that artistic expression hangs in the balance.1 86 Despite
the force of the First Amendment arguments, infringement courts in-
voke them only sporadically. 187
Beyond the specific protections of the First Amendment is a gen-
eral sense that parody is an integral component of American culture
that should be treasured and protected, even in the face of a claim of
harm. 188 While parody's special status may derive in part from its his-
torical, political, and literary pedigree, parody's connection with in-
181 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 178, § 29.3.3, at 664.
182 See id.
183 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 31:147 (4th ed. 2008).
184 Id.
185 Id,
186 See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding artistic expression implicated in use of "Barbie" mark, which has transcended its
original purpose and entered "'public discourse and become an integral part of our vocab-
ulary'" (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002))).
187 See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61
SMU L. Rsv. 381 (2008) (arguing that courts should apply First Amendment analysis to
more trademark infringement cases).
188 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that trademark analysis begins with "the recognition that parody serves as a 'hu-
morous form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back as far as Greek
antiquity'" (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.
1987))); New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 156-57 (Tex. 2004) (finding that an
objective test of reasonableness in a defamation action is necessary to give parody and
satire the breathing space they require). Adopting a contrasting tone, one treatise writer
has explained that "the cry of 'parody!' does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate
claims of trademark infringement .... There are confusing parodies and non-confusing
parodies .... A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not confusing." McCARTHY,
supra note 183, § 31:153.
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congruity may explain its favored status in court decisions. As one
nonlegal theorist opines, "The best parodies suggest a secret similarity
between realms presumed to be very different, such as religion and
computers.... ."89 Trademark cases reflect this same judgment about
parody. Indeed, courts adjudicating parody arguments in trademark
infringement cases often track incongruity theory in evaluating facts.
Thus, for example, in JordacheEnterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,190 the
court rejected an infringement claim by exploring the stylistic incon-
sistencies between the actual trademark ofJordache jeans and the al-
legedly infringing mark: the actual mark was small, in subtle colors,
and featured a horse's head; the allegedly infringing mark was a
"large, brightly colored pig head and two hooves, giving the appear-
ance that a pig is peering over the back pocket."191
Other infringement cases similarly compare the consistency be-
tween the protected product and the allegedly infringing activity, as-
sessing any aesthetic connection between the two and the likelihood
that the plaintiff would engage in the challenged activity. 192 Where
the aesthetic connection is strong, but not identical, the parody is
deemed successful and legal protections are more likely to attach.
The parody succeeds only after first establishing an overlap with the
protected product and then presenting an incongruity. As trademark
courts explain, parody juxtaposes "the irreverent representation of
First Amendment case law also illustrates an affection for parody, as illustrated in the
following intentional infliction of emotional distress case:
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying
George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions
and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political
debate .... From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political dis-
course would have been considerably poorer without them.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-56 (1988).
189 DAvis, supra note 84, at 22; see also Palmer, supra note 25, at 81-82 (tracing the
historic roots of parody and noting that "arguably, it was the element of comic incongruity
in parody which distinguished it from other forms of imitation").
190 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
191 Id. at 1485.
192 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (rea-
soning that no infringement takes place where protected mark concerns an ordinary man-
ufactured product and alleged infringing activity is an artistic title); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did
It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1229-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (comparing product uses, marketing
channels, product quality, and aesthetic similarities of message and finding a possibility of
confusion where parodist used slogan JUST DID IT together with the MIKE mark to par-
ody the slogan JUST DO IT associated with NIKE mark); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-
Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying preliminary injunc-
tion against defendant distributing T-shirts featuring "Miami Mice," which "lightheartedly
focus on two comical mice ... who do not evoke the themes of crime and violence," where
plaintiffs television show "Miami Vice" portrayed "tough, courageous, and stylish detec-
tives who fight against notoriously evil criminal figures"); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy &
Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding preliminary injunction appropriate
to prevent defendant from producing diaper bags with words and markings confusingly
similar to plaintiff's trademarks).
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the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark's
owner." 193 By playing on the "idealized image," the trademark parody
takes advantage of the pleasurable sense of shared knowledge be-
tween joke participants, which humor theorists identify as one of hu-
mor's important social benefits. 194
Trademark courts are precise about how this shared knowledge
should manifest if a trademark parody is to escape liability. In lan-
guage drawn from dictionaries and the work of humanities scholars,
courts define parody as an "artistic work that imitates the characteris-
tic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule"'9 5 and
recognize that parodies satisfying this definition bear inherent contra-
dictions or incongruities. As courts often state, "A parody must con-
vey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: that it is the
original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody."'19 6
Thus, a parody must navigate a fine line between mimicry and devia-
tion. Where the parody comes too close to mimicry, liability is likely:
"[T]he parody has to be a takeoff, not a ripoff. '197 Stated differently,
where a parody insufficiently distances itself from the original pro-
tected mark, courts consider it "a poor parody ... vulnerable under
trademark law, since the customer will be confused."' 98 Alternatively,
where too much deviation occurs, liability is also likely. Thus, for ex-
ample, where the parody does not directly concern the protected
product or mark, but instead just uses the mark as a means to make a
193 L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 34; see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying same definition).
194 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text for discussion of this beneficial con-
sequence of humor.
195 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003); Lyons
P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1999). Although courts in trademark
actions routinely invoke this definition, the U.S. Supreme Court first adopted it in the
copyright context. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (quoting
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1317 (3d ed. 1992)). See
supra note 6 for further discussion of courts' use of nonlegal scholarship in evaluating
parody claims.
196 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769,
777 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding an infringement because defendant's use of plaintiffs mark
.conveys that it is the original, but ... founders on its failure to convey that it is not the
original").
197 Nike, Inc., 6 F.3d at 1228.
198 Cliffs Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 494; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling
Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How to Stop Wonying and Learn to Love Ambiguity 11
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 06-30; Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-39, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929534 ("[T]he more thoroughly expressive the use-the
more the mark has been recoded or distorted-the harder it has been to convincingly
argue that consumers will likely be confused.").
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joke, courts are more willing to attach liability. 19 9 In other words, the
would-be parodist wishing to avoid liability must setup an incon-
gruity-present the original and cast it in an unanticipated or unlikely
light. Through this requirement, trademark doctrine artfully tracks
the line between parody and satire mapped in the nonlegal humor
literature .200
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc. 20 1 analyzed the internal
contradiction requirement. The court rejected a challenge to a ver-
dict favoring a defendant who had modeled a T-shirt after the
Budweiser label, declaring Myrtle Beach to be the "King of
Beaches." 20 2 Concluding the T-shirt was "readily recognizable as a
parody,"20 3 the court explained that a jury could reasonably conclude
that consumers would not likely believe that Anheuser-Busch sold or
sponsored the T-shirt. The court thus protected the attempted hu-
mor because it succeeded as true parody: "Successful trademark take-
offs dispel consumer confusion by conveying just enough of the
original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point of the
parody."20 4 Finding the parody effective because the T-shirt conveyed
some of the original Budweiser label design, the court appeared to
appreciate that humor operates most effectively where it draws on
shared knowledge of the participants in the joke.20 5 Stated differ-
ently, the court may have chosen to protect the humor from legal
regulation because it reinforced an important sense of shared knowl-
edge among members of American culture.
It is, of course, no coincidence that incongruity analysis is rele-
vant to the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry as well as a parody claim:
defendants make a parody argument to negate the plaintiff's claim of
likelihood of confusion. The incongruity analysis, however, seems to
accomplish more than simply implementing the doctrinal require-
ments of trademark. Rather, the analysis protects those parodies that
foster deeper understanding of a phenomenon, while communicating
to the audience that they are simply a jest.
Complications emerge where the alleged infringements extend
beyond wholesome themes into taboo areas. Here, the cases become
less predictable and less clearly aligned with incongruity analysis.
199 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
defendants liable for using Elvis Presley trademarks where they sought to parody the Las
Vegas lounge scene of the sixties rather than Elvis Presley himself).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48 for discussion of humor theory on satire
and parody.
201 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992).
202 Id. at 319.
203 Id. at 321.
204 Id.
205 See COHEN, supra note 25, at 28.
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While defendants may find humor in the parodies, courts are often
not amused, identifying a trademark violation but frequently provid-
ing little or no reasoning for holding that the plaintiff demonstrated
the requisite level of confusion necessary to establish infringement.
Even if strong incongru'ity is arguably present, the court might find a
trademark infringement, presumably concerned that harm results be-
cause the parody is not good-natured fun.
In an early example, a federal district court held that a defendant
who distributed items marked with the "GE" monogram and the
words "Genital Electric" violated the General Electric trademark, sum-
marily finding a "great probability of confusion among the general
public. 20 6 Similarly, the court of appeals identified a trademark viola-
tion in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,20 7
where the defendant had produced a pornographic film with women
wearing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniforms engaged in sex acts.
Although one could interpret this as a parody of provocative half-time
performances during actual football games, the court of appeals, not-
ing the "sexually depraved" nature of the film, found an
infringement.2 0 8
The General Electric and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders courts evinced
less concern with analyzing incongruity and likelihood of confusion
than courts in other parody cases where the alleged infringement's
subject matter did not venture into morally dubious territory.20 9 One
206 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1036-37 (D. Mass.
1979). In so holding, the district court noted that the monogram on defendant's products
was "virtually identical to plaintiff's trademark." Id. at 1036. The court did not explain,
however, how the public would ever think that General Electric Company would market
products using the word "genital."
The General Electric court cited as precedent Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), where the court enjoined the defendant from selling a poster
depicting an exact reproduction of Coca-Cola's trademark with the script letters "ine" re-
placing "-Cola," so that the poster read "Enjoy Cocaine." Gen. Elec. Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. at
1036-37. Unlike in General Electric, however, the Coca-Cola holding rested on actual evi-
dence that irate consumers believed that the soft-drink company endorsed the cocaine
posters. Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1189 n.9. Nevertheless, one could explain the Coca-Cola
result-as one can for many trademark cases-by concluding that the taboo context for
the case rendered the parody not funny for the court. More recent experience reflects this
sentiment, with the Food and Drug Administration and state attorneys general taking ac-
tion against a company marketing an energy drink called "Cocaine." See Alfonso Serrano,
"Cocaine" Pulled from Shelves Nationwide, CBS NEWS, May 7, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2007/05/07/health/main2772524.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). Speaking of
the energy drink, the Connecticut attorney general stated, "Our goal is to literally flush
Cocaine down the drain across the nation." (By contrast, the beverage company stated:
"We like to think we have a great sense of humor.") Id.
207 604 F.2d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1979).
208 Id. at 205-06.
209 One treatise suggests that, for morally dubious parodies, courts might worry about
financial harm to the plaintiff resulting from association with the parody. SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 178, § 29.3, at 666-67 (making this argument for Dallas Cowboys and
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could in fact brand the topics parodied in General Electric and Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders as aligned with release humor, thereby illustrating
courts' greater inclination to regulate release humor than incongruity
humor unrelated to taboo topics. Across the universe of trademark
cases on taboo topics, however, the results are not clear cut; for paro-
dies featuring topics associated with release humor, infringement
cases reflect unpredictable "know-it-when-I-see-it" 210 judgment calls
about confusion. For example, a similar case brought by the Girl
Scouts of America does not reflect the General Electric and Dallas Cow-
boys Cheerleaders perspective. There, the Girl Scouts lost an infringe-
ment action based on a poster featuring a girl wearing a Junior Girl
Scout uniform, with her hands clasped above her pregnant abdomen
and the slogan "BE PREPARED" appearing next to her hands.211 In-
voking incongruity analysis to assess the infringement claim, the court
first evaluated the presence of the Girl Scout name, slogan, and dis-
tinctive trefoil design on the poster. 212 The court also noted that the
Girl Scouts organization produced posters distributed to the public.213
Nevertheless, comparing the poster to a situation where one might
attempt to abuse the Girl Scout mark in selling cookies, the court ulti-
mately stated that a member of the public using "rational analysis"
would not "believe that the Girl Scouts are the authors of the
poster."214
Girl Scouts may be a harbinger of the contemporary trend toward
tolerating release humor, relying simply on incongruity analysis even
for parodies that use taboo themes. In fact, at least one court has
arguably elevated such a trend to the realm of doctrine, stating that a
parody's unsavory or controversial quality will render the parody less
capable of causing public confusion and therefore less susceptible to
Coca-Cola). Indeed, one might hypothesize that courts were concerned primarily with in-
jury from tarnishment rather than actual infringement. This may be a particularly salient
motivation where a plaintiff is unable to establish the heightened requirements for tarnish-
ment liability. Whatever the courts' motivations, however, they found infringement liabil-
ity in both cases. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 207; Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at
1192-93.
210 SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
211 Girl Scouts of the U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1230
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding no copyright violation for parody of "I Love New York" jingle
using words "I Love Sodom"), affd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
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infringement liability.215 Despite society's increasing disposition to-
ward tolerating taboo subject matter, 216 the infringement case law still
more fully embraces wholesome parody and takes on a far more inde-
terminate quality in analyzing taboo topics, 2 17 even in cases invoking
the First Amendment. 218
In conclusion, then, the trademark infringement cases reflect the
dichotomy traced elsewhere in the law. Where nontaboo subjects are
concerned, the courts' trademark analysis focuses nearly exclusively
on incongruity.219 If a modicum of reasoning can establish that the
parody would not confuse the consumer, the court upholds the par-
ody under incongruity theory.220 Where this occurs, the law conveys
tolerance for superiority humor, because, after all, parody usually op-
erates by poking fun at or ridiculing something. 221 My thesis is that
this tolerance occurs only where the court finds sufficient incongruity
to withhold regulation. In other words, the incongruity serves as a
policing mechanism, keeping the ridicule on safe turf.222 Yet, as soon
215 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972 (C.D. Cal.
2007) ("[T]he more distasteful and bizarre the parody, the less likely the public is to mis-
takenly think that the trademark owner has sponsored or approved it.").
216 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71 (1992)
("Virtually all parodies are humorous and many people may prefer a humorous to a seri-
ous version, especially when the 'serious' version is itself ... without moral or intellectual
pretension. Some parodies are erotic .... [and] may supply the demand for the original
on the part of the segment of the population that likes its entertainment spiced with sex.");
Jessica Taran, Dilution by Tarnishment: A Case for Vulgar Humor, 7 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1,
10 (2002) (arguing that both vulgar humor and "higher" art "deserve the same level of
protection").
217 See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311, 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding no
infringement where website known as www.fallwell.com contained arguments about Rever-
end Jerry Falwell's "untruths about gay people" and cited portions of the Bible favoring
Falwell's "gay and lesbian neighbors"); Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 386, 390
(5th Cir. 1999) (finding no infringement for parody where sports mascot in the form of a
giant "[c]hicken would flip, slap, tackle, trample, and generally assault the Barney look-
alike").
218 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech:
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 913-15
(2005) (noting problems with "line-drawing" and inconsistent results in trademark cases
"related to drug use, sexuality, obscenity, and noxious behavior"). See generally Dreyfuss,
supra note 198, at 16-18 (noting unpredictable results of First Amendment defense in
trademark infringement suits against parodies of trademarked material, resulting in risk
"for any one who is contemplating an investment in expressive use").
219 See, e.g., Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
220 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 319-22 (4th Cir.
1992).
221 See, e.g., Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901-02
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against production of the
pornographic film Starballz after finding Starballz to be parody of Star Wars "in that it is a
'literary or artistic work that broadly mimics an author's characteristic style and holds it up
to ridicule'" (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997))).
222 This policing mechanism includes the legal requirement that "the very thing being
sold"-such as the poster, T-shirt, or film-"is the parody itself." SCHECHTER & THOMAS,
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as other elements seep in-such as taboo subjects-the policing
mechanism breaks down and liability more likely attaches to the par-
ody. 2 2 3 By necessity, the uncertain nature of infringement case law
tempers this conclusion. Viewed collectively, infringement case law
gives the impression of a free-for-all, incorporating scattered factors
unrelated to the type of humor at issue-such as First Amendment
values, the noncommercial nature of the parody, and alternative ave-
nues of expression.224 Nonetheless, the parody/likelihood-of-confu-
sion doctrines and many case results establish that incongruity humor
inspires the law to step aside and release humor fosters results that,
although unpredictable, are more welcoming of legal regulation.
2. Trademark Dilution
The theory of dilution litigation holds that just because a parody
might not mislead a consumer into believing a trademark holder
would ridicule its own symbols, dilution may nonetheless harm the
trademark holder by "lessening the 'commercial magnetism' or
'magic' of the mark by either associating it with a multiplicity of di-
verse sources, or by associating it with something distasteful or off-
putting."225 Like infringement litigation concerning taboo topics, di-
lution litigation yields varying results. 226 Part of the explanation for
the divergent results in dilution cases comes from the fact that many
dilution claims arise under state law. Because state laws vary, different
supra note 178, § 30.6, at 719 (interpreting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25(2) (1995)); see, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1400-01 (applying rule that parody
must make fun of original work itself). In other words, a parody avoids legal regulation
only where it pokes fun at "the parodied work" rather than using that work to attack some-
thing else. Posner, supra note 216, at 67 (arguing that the copyright exemption for paro-
dies "should not extend to cases in which the parody does not attack the parodied work
but rather uses that work to attack something else"); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 & n.14 (1994) (recognizing copyright rule that a work is not
entitled to special consideration as a "parody" unless it targets the plaintiffs work).
Analyzed in light of humor theories, this principle is neutral in its approach to superi-
ority humor because it does not regulate the degree of ridicule in society, but rather only
the mechanism for expressing ridicule. The rule arguably reinforces the preference for
humor based on incongruity and contradiction because it flows from the requirement that
an acceptable parody must mimic a phenomenon at the same time it ridicules that phe-
nomenon. Nonlegal materials identifying the qualities of parody, however, do not univer-
sally reflect this requirement. See Palmer, supra note 25, at 80 (asserting that the purpose
of parody "may be mockery of the original, mockery of some other associated entity, or
mere playful allusion").
223 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1037 (D.
Mass. 1979).
224 See Taran, supra note 216, at 3 (analyzing infringement claims against unwhole-
some parodies and "finding that the potential harm caused by such vulgar humor does not
justify the chilling effect that the inconsistent legal doctrine of tarnishment has on other-
wise unhindered free speech").
225 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 178, § 30.6, at 719.
226 Taran, supra note 216, at 4-5 (reporting inconsistent antidilution case law).
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legal requirements govern the cases, yielding different results. Al-
though one might have expected the differences among results to di-
minish after the 1995 enactment of the federal statute authorizing a
federal dilution cause of action, case results continue to vary.227
As dilution law evolved, courts and scholars identified two theo-
ries: blurring and tarnishment. 228 Blurring occurs when consumers
might identify one trademark with two separate sources (as opposed
to infringement, which causes consumers to identify similar marks
with one source) 229 Blurring causes an injury arising from the mark's
value diminishing, not from consumer confusion. 230  By contrast,
tarnishment causes an injury arising because the diluting product cre-
ates negative associations with the protected mark.231 Most case law
grappling with parodies deals with the tarnishment theory.23 2 Courts
have even observed that parodies tend to increase rather than de-
crease public identification of marks, thereby undermining blurring
as a liability theory.233
Despite variety in results, cases reveal that the success of a dilu-
tion cause of action often turns on the taboo or unsavory quality of
the humor. Thus, where the humor's subject matter is condoms 234 or
227 Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 198, at 11-15 (reporting on courts' growing skepticism of
liability for dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995).
228 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (identifying
a dilution theory to supplement blurring and tarnishment that applies when a competitor
makes alterations to a mark in order to diminish its favorable attributes).
229 4 MCARTHY, supra note 183, § 24:69 (defining dilution by blurring).
230 Id. McCarthy refers to a restaurant using the famous mark TIFFANY as an example
where no confusion would result because consumers assume that the jewelry store is not
running the restaurant and simply think the restaurant is trying to sound high class. How-
ever, the result would undermine the "unique and distinctive link between the word TIF-
FANY and a certain chain of fashionable jewelry stores." Id.
231 Id. § 24:70 (defining dilution by tarnishment).
232 Id. § 24:90 (reviewing cases for tarnishment theory). See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc.
v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558-59 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding grant of summary
judgment on blurring claim but finding factual issue that parody might be actionable
under tarnishment theory).
233 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v.Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that defendant's merchandising of puppet character named Spa'am, a par-
ody of plaintiffs luncheon meat, would lead to greater public identification of plaintiff's
trademark); World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413, 441 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that defendant's parodies of plaintiffs wrestling charac-
ters, sold as T-shirts and other forms of consumer merchandise, would more likely increase
rather than decrease public identification of plaintiffs trademark). Courts also tend to
refer to the "broad" quality of the humor in a parody in determining that blurring does
not occur. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d
410, 421-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting blurring claim and describing as "broad" humor a
parody of Tommy Hilfiger products by a pet fragrance called "Timmy Holedigger").
234 See Am. Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006,
2007, 2012-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding preliminary injunction appropriate for dilution
claim where defendant produced a condom carrying case featuring gladiator head with
words "America Express" and "Don't Leave Home Without It").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1235
oral sex, 2 3 5 for example, courts are more likely to find dilution than
where the subject matter concerns a high-pitched voice imitating a
Barbie d01123 6 or pet dog products bearing parodies of high-end prod-
uct names. 23 7 For dilution cases that rely on the tarnishment theory,
this result is not surprising. After all, the general purpose of the
tarnishment theory is to redress injuries caused by degrading a mark's
positive associations and using it for "unwholesome or degrading
goods or services. ' 238 Intolerance for release humor is not only an
inherent part of the dilution cause of action, but it also defines its
reason for being. Faithfully executing the law's intent, courts have
found dilution by tarnishment where a defendant used a plaintiff's
trademark in the context of humor based on bodily functions and
drug culture as well as adult cartoons, websites, live entertainment,
and movies. 23 9 As in the infringement setting, tarnishment cases are
unpredictable, with parodies on relatively uncontroversial subjects
sometimes becoming entangled in the liability net 240 and unsavory
subject matter occasionally avoiding capture. 24 1 On balance, however,
the tarnishment cases tend to regulate release humor more than
other types.
235 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 125-26, 135
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding injunctive relief appropriate under dilution theory where defen-
dant depicted plaintiff's "Poppin' Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh" characters "engaged in sexual
intercourse and fellatio"); see also Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942,
944, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (issuing preliminary injunction under tarnishment theory where
website operated by King VelVeeda, www.cheesygraphics.com, purported to parody the
cheese product "Velveeta" and featured photos of nude women in sexually suggestive
poses).
236 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a
dilution claim where rock group featured a high-pitched voice as the voice of a Barbie
doll). See generally Taran, supra note 216, at 3 (arguing that tarnishment litigation "allows
courts to exercise viewpoint discrimination to censor vulgar matter").
237 Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th Cir.
2007) (affirming dismissal of dilution by tarnishment claim under federal law based on
"Chewy Vuiton" dog toys with names such as "Chewnel #5" and "Dog Perignonn"); Tommy
Hilfiger Licensing, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 422-23.
238 4 McCARTy, supra note 183, § 24:70. But cf Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 507
(stating that although tarnishment occurs when a "likeness is placed in the context of
sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity," it "is not limited to seamy conduct").
239 See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 183, § 24:89 (listing these as tarnishment categories).
240 See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555-58 (2d
Cir. 2002) (finding possibility of viable tarnishment claim where defendant used the term
"New York $lot Exchange" as an "obvious pun" on the term "New York Stock Exchange");
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771-72, 777-79 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding possibility of viable tarnishment claim when humor magazine ran parody ad fea-
turing "Michelob Oily" as a commentary on an oil spill near an Anheuser-Busch brewery).
For a set of cases in which dilution claims against parodies of uncontroversial subjects were
rejected, see Louis Vuitton Malletier, 507 F.3d at 268; Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 221 F. Supp.
2d at 422-23.
241 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (finding animated pornographic film Starballz a parody of Star Wars films and re-
jecting dilution by tarnishment liability).
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Although the dilution cases reflect a less explicit preference for
humor based on incongruity than the infringement cases, the dilution
cases do embrace the treasured status of parody with equal (and per-
haps even greater) vigor. In dilution cases, the balance necessary to
evaluate whether a parody dilutes the goodwill and reputation associ-
ated with a particular trademark often inspires strong statements
about parody's importance in human society.242 Courts often link this
historical factor with First Amendment protections as well. 243 Perhaps
more importantly, the dilution statute makes an explicit exception for
parodies. 244 Thus, while tarnishment cases do not accord preferred
treatment to all incongruity humor, they generally avoid liability for a
type of humor with roots in incongruity-parody. And, to that extent,
tarnishment cases ultimately privilege incongruity humor-the back-
bone of parody's definition. 245
C. The Law Often Steps In: Sexual Harassment in Employment
Sexual harassment law stacks the deck against superiority and re-
lease humor. In fact, the liability theory here focuses almost exclu-
sively on a subject associated with release humor: sex.246 Moreover,
sexual harassment claims involving humor seek to remedy oppressive
statements and actions creating a hostile working environment. Cases
focus on speech and expressive conduct that belittle the joke's target
and often manifest as an attempted joke.2 47 As such, hostile environ-
242 See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1987)
(citing importance of parody to social commentary in rejecting a dilution claim based on
an article depicting "L.L. Bean's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog"); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that "'[d]estructive' parodies play an important
role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protection even though they may dis-
courage or discredit an original author").
243 See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29, 33-34 (holding that dilution claim must yield to First
Amendment interests).
244 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) explicitly excludes "[a]ny fair use ... of a
famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person's own
goods or services, including use in connection with ... parodying, criticizing, or comment-
ing upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner" from
the category of actionable blurring or tarnishment claims. As pointed out in Louis Vuitton
Malletier, 507 F.3d at 266, this exclusion for parody is not absolute, excluding from its
coverage parody that is used as a trademark ("designation of source") itself.
245 This privilege is circumscribed, as the regulatory sweep of dilution law extends only
to commercial speech. See Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 applies only to commercial use
of a trademark to protect First Amendment concerns). Parody, however, does more than
fuel a commercial transaction; it is therefore noncommercial expression and outside the
ambit of trademark dilution law. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792,
812 (9th Cir. 2003).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 87-98.
247 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998) (involv-
ing sexual harassment claim in which plaintiff was picked on and called "a name sug-
gesting homosexuality").
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ment sexual harassment claims reflect the law's readiness to regulate
superiority humor. By contrast, the sexual harassment cases show an
inclination not to regulate where incongruity humor is central to the
claim.
1. Elements of a Sexual Harassment Claim
The federal statute prohibiting sex discrimination in employ-
ment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protects against sexual
harassment, including quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment.248  Of the two types, hostile environ-
ment harassment is the most likely to involve humor. Unlike a quid
pro quo sexual harassment claim, a claim for hostile environment sex-
ual harassment arises even if the harasser did not put the claimant in
the position of providing sex to keep her job.249 Several states have
statutes derived from Title VII, and state courts frequently use Title
VII case law to interpret their own statutes in evaluating hostile envi-
ronment claims. 250 The state cases that I cite in this section fall within
this category.
For a sexual harassment claim to succeed, Title VII requires that
the harassment arise "because of' the plaintiff's membership in one of
the protected classes. 251 An employer violates Title VII when, "be-
cause of' the employee's membership in a protected class, the em-
ployer causes the workplace to be "permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment. ' 25 2 The "because
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006), which reads in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex... ; or...
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's ... sex ....
249 See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 118-20
(2001) (describing quid pro quo sexual harassment as the termination or disadvantaging
of an employee who refuses a blatant demand from a supervisor for sexual favors, and
distinguishing hostile environment harassment, which is not necessarily sexual).
250 See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 414 (D.N.J. 1996)
("The New Jersey courts have consistently recognized the influence of Title VII law in
interpreting the NJLAD [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination].").
251 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (noting that, in the
sexual harassment context, Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of ... sex"); HAC,-
CARD, supra note 249, at 59 ("The operative language of Title VII is that no employer shall
discriminate against any employee because of certain characteristics.").
252 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
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of' requirement focuses sex discrimination claims on a subject matter
of release humor: sex.
Emphasizing that Congress did not intend Title VII to impose "a
general civility code for the American workplace," 253 the U.S. Su-
preme Court has admonished that occasional abusive comments, gen-
der-related jokes, and teasing do not necessarily make a hostile
environment. 254 Whether a workplace environment is hostile is an in-
quiry that focuses on context, looking at factors such as the frequency
and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether it "unreasonably"
interferes with an employee's work performance, and whether it af-
fects the employee's psychological well-being. 255 Economic, personal,
or psychological harm are relevant but not necessary for a plaintiff to
succeed. The inquiry requires "careful consideration of the social
context in which particular behavior occurs."25 6 Significantly, a U.S.
Department of Labor pamphlet states that actionable harassment can
arise if a coworker makes sexual jokes that make it hard to work.257
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "simple teasing, offhand
comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)" will not
themselves suffice. 2 58
2. Sexual Harassment Cases Compared with Trademark and Contract
Cases
The context for sexual harassment humor in the workplace has
different parameters than humor in a mass setting, such as that adju-
dicated in trademark cases and the contract cases dealing with adver-
tisements. The workplace context fosters interpersonal jockeying,
which does not color mass-produced parodies or other public humor.
Thus, for example, interpersonal humor can function as "an oblique
display of power and control disguised as good fun. ' 259 In the context
of interaction between sexes, the subtleties are complex. One com-
mentator described the power dynamic as follows:
[T] he target [of apparent humor] is left with the awkward question:
Is it an insult or just ajoke? If the former, one should protest or risk
being seen as a pushover. Yet to take a joke seriously signals one's
253 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
254 See id. at 81.
255 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
256 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
257 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Sexual Harassment; Know Your Rights (1994), available at
http://www.empowermentzone.com/harass.txt (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). For works that
cite or discuss the brochure, see BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 26; Volokh, Hostile Work Envi-
ronment, supra note 2, at 633.
258 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
259 Quinn, supra note 136, at 1163.
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chains and potentially marks one as socially clumsy and overly sensi-
tive. This ambiguity serves to bound the target's response .... 260
Given this context, it comes as no surprise that employment law regu-
lates attempts at humor that are easily characterized as superiority hu-
mor. Moreover, the power politics of sexual harassment cases-
deeply rooted in sex roles, personal relationships, and workplace dy-
namics-is not necessarily present in either the trademark cases or
the contract cases. From the point of view of humor regulation, sex-
ual harassment makes possible a range of injuries and involves group
implications not at play in the contract and trademark contexts. The
workplace context implicates complex questions about the double-
edged (adaptive/maladaptive) effect of humor and its feedback
loops, 2 6 1 questions that are largely absent in trademark and contract
litigation. Thus, the humor presents issues relating to gender, sexual-
ity, and the function of humor in the workplace-all issues about
which nonlegal scholars have generated a rich literature. 262
Humor theorists' work on gender, sexuality, and employment
provides an important complement to existing legal literature on sex-
ual harassment claims and the First Amendment. 2 63 For the purpose
260 Id.
261 See supra notes 126-44 and accompanying text for a general description of these
phenomena.
262 For a discussion of gender and humor, see, for example, REGINA BARRECA, THEY
USED TO CALL ME SNOW WHITE ... BUT I DRIFrED: WOMEN'S STRATEGIC USE OF HUMOR
(1991); COHEN, supra note 25, at 69 (postulating that women tend not to be joke tellers
because they might "have other conversational devices for establishing and maintaining
intimacy, while for at least some men,joke-telling is a primary device of this kind"); Martin
D. Lampert & Susan M. Ervin-Tripp, Risky Laughter: Teasing and Self-Directed Joking Among
Male and Female Friends, 38J. PRAGMATICS 51, 51 (2006) (studying humor in conversation as
it relates to gender role expectations about "aggression, power, and self-disclosure").
For a discussion of sexuality and humor, see, for example, Chapman & Foot, supra
note 22, at xi (reporting that social scientists have found that sexual activity and enjoyment
most directly determine the appreciation of sexual humor); Baron, supra note 132 (pre-
dicting that "nonexploitative sexual humor would prove more effective in reducing subse-
quent aggression than exploitative sexual humor").
For a discussion of humor and the workplace, see, for example, PALMER, supra note
143, at 59 (noting one social scientist's conclusion that humor "functions to ease tensions
caused by the contradiction between hierarchy and collegiality"); Martin, supra note 16, at
203 (arguing that humor's ability to strengthen human relationships and to provide en-
hanced feelings of closeness and links with others is beneficial to moderating stress); Jo-
seph Alan Ullian, Joking at Work, 26J. COMM. 129 (1976) (analyzing how banter and joking
help organizations remain stable in the face of change), cited in ROECKELEIN, supra note 15,
at 68.
263 The interrelationship between Title VII and First Amendment rights is well docu-
mented in law review literature. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First
Amendment: Title VIl's Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 563, 580, 597
(2001); Volokh, Hostile Work Environment, supra note 2. Judicial decisions, however, have
less to offer on this issue. See Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. Rv. 1711,
1759 (2007) (noting that "I t] he pages of the Federal Reporters... remain amazingly light"
on the relationship between the First Amendment and Title VII).
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of this inaugural effort to analyze the law's attempt to "regulate
funny," however, I leave analysis of this important material for future
study. Instead, to provide a focused and coherent comparison with
trademark and contract law, I review the harassment cases with an eye
toward identifying the types of humor courts choose to regulate.
3. Humor in the Sexual Harassment Cases
While searching the sexual harassment cases for details about the
humor at issue in the suit, I often encountered obstacles in the way
the opinions describe the humor. Often, case reports refer only to
euphemisms such as "off-color jokes" or "sexual comments and innu-
endo, ' 264 without describing the precise content. In many cases, deci-
sions reflect the recent trend toward summarily rejecting employment
discrimination claims, with courts citing insufficient hostility or sever-
ity in the harassing environment. 265 Illustrating this trend, Judge
Richard Posner reacted as follows to a plaintiffs complaint about her
supervisor's sexual humor:
It is no doubt distasteful to a sensitive woman to have such a silly
man as one's boss, but only a woman of Victorian delicacy-a
woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American popular
culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity-would find [the supervi-
sor's] patter substantially more distressing than . . .heat and ciga-
rette smoke .... 266
The courts have thus set a high bar on the gravity of offense necessary
to state a claim. Accordingly, where courts do find actionable miscon-
duct, the misconduct is often accompanied by physical bullying, thus
making extensive analysis of the oral communications less necessary
and rendering the cases less pertinent to this study.267
Cases detailing the precise content of communications at issue
usually depict superiority and release humor. As noted above, the ten-
dency of challenged communications to fall into these categories is
not surprising because the cause of action requirements channel
claims toward offending comments of this kind. In cases involving
superiority and release humor, courts tend to determine that the hu-
mor was either sufficiently pervasive to pollute the workplace environ-
264 See, e.g., Saltzberg v. Med. Weight Loss Ctr., Inc., No. 01-P-1438, 2003 WL 22510331,
at *2, *4 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003).
265 See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized ? An Empirical Analy-
sis of Employment Discrimination as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663, 675-80, 691
(documenting how courts are limiting availability of sexual harassment and other discrimi-
nation claims).
266 Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995).
267 See, e.g., Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp., 887 So. 2d 372, 375, 377-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (using federal hostile environment law to find liability under state statute where
harassing coworker tapped plaintiff, made repeated kissing noises, and "rammed his erect
penis into her buttocks").
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ment2 68 or insufficiently frequent or severe to merit the imposition of
liability.
2 6 9
Two classic cases in which the court found superiority and release
humor providing a basis for hostile environment liability are Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc. 270 and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 2 7 1 In
Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court described a workplace where a super-
visor frequently uttered to the plaintiff, "You're a woman, what do you
know," suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to nego-
tiate [plaintiffs] raise," and queried in response to the plaintiffs suc-
cess with a sale, "What did you do, promise the guy . . . some [sex]
Saturday night?"2 72 Although the Court did not characterize these pu-
tative jokes as asserting superiority, it found in them sufficient hostility
to merit remanding the case for further consideration of sexual har-
assment liability.2 73 The district court in Robinson more directly char-
acterized the humor in that case as asserting superiority.2 74
Evaluating a host of comments such as, "Hey pussycat, come here and
give me a whiff' and "she's sitting on a goldmine," the Robinson court
stated that "sexual joking" of this kind is likely to lead to the "stere-
otyping of women in terms of their sex object status."275
A recent decision evaluating similarly pervasive sexual humor was
the only case I found in any area of law that explicitly references hu-
mor theory: McIntyre v. Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 276 McIn-
268 For an example of an appellate court finding jokes so "deeply offensive" and "egre-
gious" as to require the lower court to enter judgment for the plaintiff "since no other
result would be consistent with the record," see Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors
Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1994). Indeed, a court's characterization of com-
ments as "vulgar," "humiliating," "demeaning," or "sexist" currently appears to be a neces-
sary condition for liability. See, e.g., Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027,
1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing grant of summary judgment on basis of "demeaning"
and "sexist" comments); Rush v. Speedway Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1274-75 (D. Kan. 2007) (denying summary judgment motion where manager's comments
were "deplorable," "humiliating," "vulgar," and "sleazy").
269 See, e.g., Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 170 F. App'x 853, 854-56 (4th Cir. 2006)
(finding no hostile work environment where workplace contained Penthouse and Playboy
magazines and at least fifteen sexually oriented faxes, cartoons, and e-mails); Nowak v.
Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 05-CV-6273T, 2007 WL 894214, at *1-2, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
21, 2007) (finding an allegation of hostile environment insufficient when based on one
comment from supervisor to plaintiff that he would "like to whip her cream" and two jokes
not directly concerning the plaintiff).
270 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
271 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
272 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
273 Id. at 23.
274 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1504-05 (finding credible the testimony of plaintiffs ex-
pert witness who testified as to the "power structure or hierarchy in the work environment"
and how "persons in the positions of power" can create an "in-group/out-group effect" that
can trivialize valid complaints of female employees).
275 Id. at 1498, 1500, 1504-05.
276 669 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 & n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (referring to the works of
Sigmund Freud and Jerry Palmer).
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tyre describes coworker comments alluding to the plaintiffs gender
and sexuality: "laughingly" quipping that the plaintiff "used [her] mis-
carriage as an excuse to miss work," stating that plaintiff was obviously
pregnant because her "tits were larger," and referring to the plaintiff
as a "bitch on a broom."277 Finding liability for hostile environment
harassment, the court said this humor reflected "barnyard type cru-
elty," sometimes based on the "misfortune of others. ' 278 Concluding
that the law should punish the comments, the court even opined that
the challenged statements "[t] 'aint funny."279 These characterizations
make plain that the court's liability determination rested on the evi-
dence of superiority and release in the challenged comments.
Tracking trends in the contract and trademark areas, sexual har-
assment cases suggest that incongruity humor-where present-helps
inoculate allegedly harassing communications from liability even in
the face of release and superiority humor. Two cases illustrate this
apparent protective effect of incongruity humor. In Nitsche v. CEO of
Osage Valley Electric Cooperative,280 the court evaluated pervasive "un-
wanted sexual banter" by a male foreman directed at another male
foreman. 28' Some of the offensive conduct in Nitsche appears in other
cases where courts found an actionable hostile environment: the
harassing foreman read Playboy magazine in the plaintiffs presence,
"referred to female genitalia using crude slang names, pretended he
had a pubic hair in his mouth, and made lewd comments concerning
women." 28 2 Yet the Nitsche court found no sexual harassment liability,
citing examples of humor with incongruous overtones: the harassing
foreman asked the plaintiff "how many wheels a menstrual cycle had,"
accused the male plaintiff of needing a pap smear, and posted a pic-
ture of a donkey with a drawing of a penis over a coworker's engage-
ment photo. 2 3 Apparently appreciating the absurd juxtaposition of
concepts in this humor, the Nitsche court adopted a sympathetic tone,
describing the donkey/penis joke as a "caricature," and the other
quips as evidence of the harasser's "repertoire of ribaldry."28 4 In this
277 Id. at 125.
278 Id. at 129.
279 Id. at 131 & n.5 (quoting the radio program "Fibber Magee and Molly").
280 446 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2006).
281 Id. at 844. Sexual harassment remains a viable claim for same-sex harassment, al-
though the inference that challenged conduct amounts to a proposal of sexual activity may
not be available if the harasser is not homosexual. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("The [inference of discrimination] would be available
to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the har-
asser was a homosexual.").
282 Nitsche, 446 F.3d at 843.
283 Id. The harassing foreman had also composed a poem to ridicule plaintiffs error
in allowing molasses to fall off his truck. Although not literally reflecting incongruity, the
poem has an absurd tone-if not an absurd topic. Id. at 844 n.2.
284 Id. at 846.
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"repertoire" the humor most personally offensive to the plaintiff had
the most incongruous elements. Presumably, the Nitsche court found
that this incongruity softened the comments' hostility enough to avoid
liability.
In the second case concerning incongruous humor, Lyle v. Warner
Brothers Television Productions,285 the court adjudicated a sexual harass-
ment claim by a comedy writers' assistant who helped prepare the tele-
vision program Friends. While acknowledging the graphic sexual
comments pervasive in the workplace, the court rejected the claim
largely because the defendants uttered the comments in a context
"where comedy writers were paid to create scripts highlighting adult-
themed sexual humor and jokes, and where members of both sexes
contributed and were exposed to the creative process spawning such
humor and jokes."28 6 In the Lyle court's view, this context depersonal-
ized the sex talk, thereby rendering it "nondirected" and thus insuffi-
ciently severe to justify liability.2 7 One might easily conclude,
however, that this "nondirected" quality arose as much from the in-
congruous nature of the humor as from the sexualized quality of the
scripts the writers produced. For example, the offending humor in-
cluded playful alterations on an inspirational calendar in the work-
place, with the writers "changing . . . the word 'persistence' to 'pert
tits' and 'happiness' to 'penis.' '"288 (The humor in these alterations
presumably arises in part from the unlikelihood that an innocent in-
spirational calendar would feature human sexual parts.) Similarly,
comments that were indeed personal-i.e., directed at staff mem-
bers-but nonetheless minimized by the court, also had incongruous
character. For example, the writers referenced the infertility of an
actress on the show, joking that "she had 'dried twigs' or 'dried
branches in her vagina."' 289 The absurdity of this vivid image no
doubt inspired the court to connect it with the "creative process" and
minimize its contribution to a hostile working environment. 290
Possible evidence of courts privileging incongruity humor also ap-
pears in cases evaluating puns. Theorists characterize puns as incon-
gruity humor because they connect otherwise disparate
phenomena. 291 In several recent cases, courts focused on puns that
allegedly comprised harassment and found that the harassment was
285 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006).
286 Id. at 226.
287 Id. ("[T]he defendant writers' nondirected sexual antics and sexual talk did not
contribute to an environment in which women and men were treated disparately.").
288 Id. at 218.
289 Id. at 217.
290 See id. at 226.
291 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for further discussion of the literature
on puns.
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insufficiently severe to merit liability. For example, courts rejected lia-
bility where plaintiffs were exposed to:
*jokes about President Clinton, which included "a list of 'Ben &
Jerry's New Presidential Ice Creams' containing word-plays on
names of ice cream flavors, implying either sex or
impeachment";29 2
*a reference to prosciutto ham as "prostitute ham";293
*a quip that by wearing a sleeveless shirt, the plaintiff was "enforc-
ing [her] 2nd amendment rights . . . to bare arms";294
*a reference to rubber bands as "rubbers."2
95
While these examples suggest court preferences for incongruity
humor, any conclusion that courts adjudicating sexual harassment
claims systematically bestow direct protection on this humor is tenu-
ous. The presence of mitigating factors in some cases along with the
dearth of extensive discussion of humorous remarks in others under-
mines any sweeping conclusion. The perception that incongruous hu-
mor receives direct, solicitous treatment is only anecdotal. What is
clear, however, is that courts applying sexual harassment doctrine fo-
cus primarily on regulating (and condemning) release and superiority
humor. In so doing, they indirectly privilege incongruity humor in
the eyes of the law.
III
REGULATING FUNNY: CAUSE FOR CELEBRATION AND CONCERN
The overlap between law and humor theory is striking. Courts,
like nonlegal theorists, favor incongruity humor and disfavor release
and superiority humor.29 6 Courts integrate scholarly definitions of
parody and satire into legal doctrines, and puns receive favored status
in both law and theory. And all this appears in opinions with almost
no direct citation to preexisting nonlegal scholarship. What's the ex-
planation for this overlap? Erudition of the judiciary? Common
sense? Dumb luck? I vote for common sense. And, as it turns out,
this sharing of "common sense" between courts and humor theorists
292 Hoffman v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Distribs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 367, 376 (D. Md.
2001).
293 Augustin v. Yale Club of N.Y. City, No. 03-CV-1924 (KMK), 2006 WL 2690289, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006), aff'd 274 F. App'x 76 (2d Cir. 2008).
294 Martinez v. Rapidigm, Inc., No. CV-02-1106, 2007 WL 965899, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
295 Goede v. Mare Rest., No. 95 C 5238, 1995 WNL 769766, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29,
1995). For an exception to the trend of discounting the harassing nature of puns, see Dick
v. Phone Directories Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005). In that case, the plaintiff's
supervisor and coworkers, alluding to her surname, gave her the nicknames "Ivanna Dick"
and "Granny Dick." The plaintiff, who kept a collection of stuffed cats on her desk, was
also told that "Ms. Dick had a 'pussy.'" Id. at 1261.
296 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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cuts two ways, offering both cause for celebration and cause for con-
cern about current patterns of regulating humor.
A. Cause for Celebration
1. The Different Faces of Common Sense
The "common sense" explaining the confluence of case law and
humor theory has at least three different faces: logic, humor's intrin-
sic qualities, and social norms. The logical foundation of common
sense derives from societal contexts in which courts create legal defini-
tions of claims and defenses. The notion of humor's intrinsic quali-
ties proposes that truly funny utterances may tap into "humor
receptors" found within all human psyches. Finally, social norms refer
to shared cultural preferences about humor.
The legal material summarized above outlines logical connec-
tions between legal requirements (such as the definition of a cause of
action) and humor scholarship. Take, for example, sexual harass-
ment law's focus on regulating superiority humor. Sexual harassment
law is a species of the law of wrongs, designed to impose liability in
order to remedy a personal injury. 297 The decision to regulate repre-
sentations of an individual as inferior is hardly surprising, given civil
law's function of imposing liability to remedy a "hurt." Since ad-
vanced human society seeks to reduce conflict, law has a mechanism
for discouraging hurtful behavior that might promote conflict. As citi-
zens of the same society as lawmakers, academics in nonlegal disci-
plines also focus on humor with conflict-creating potential, expending
considerable effort to explain it.2 9 8 Accordingly, nonlegal scholars
have refined a theory of superiority humor with analytical kinship to
another human context-legal regulation. Sexual harassment is but
one example where the overlap of law and humor scholarship derives
from the simple fact that both endeavors concern humanity.
The second possible face of common sense is more contestable.
Many suggest that no consensus definition of humor exists because
perception of humor is largely intuitive, thereby avoiding precise
description.299 To the extent that this intuition results from an intrin-
sic human quality (something one might call a "funny bone"), one
could argue that legal regulators and humor theorists are simply oper-
ating with the same hard-wired understanding of how humor oper-
ates. Under this view, incongruity humor arguably stimulates this
shared funny bone more effectively than any other type. Proof of
297 See note 145 for further discussion of this proposition.
298 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 132 (describing the results of an experiment designed to
test male responses to sexual humor).
299 See, e.g., Ewick & Silbey, supra note 3, at 559-60 (discussing anthropological, psy-
chological, and linguistic perspectives on the nature of humor).
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such a funny bone, however, has so far eluded cognitive scientists and
other humor theorists.
Common sense's third face-social norms-is likely the most im-
portant because its explanatory potential survives regardless of
whether one proposes that humor is constructed entirely from contin-
gent perceptions of human society300 or believes that every human
psyche harbors an intrinsic funny bone waiting for stimulation. Un-
derstanding of social norms suggests that both legal thinkers and hu-
mor theorists prefer the same types of humor because humor
appreciation is imbued with cultural preferences that the two groups
happen to share. I explore the ramifications of this thesis below.
2. Confluence Among Social Norms, Law, and Humor Theory
One can define a social norm "as an obligation backed by a nonle-
gal sanction ... such as criticizing, blaming, refusing to deal or shun-
ning ... [imposed by persons who] are not state officials." 30 1 Within
the humor context, a norm can reflect views on moral judgments
(such as the taboo against sexist jokes or racial epithets), manners
(such as discouraging children from ridiculing another child's clothes
in her presence), and taste (such as avoiding jokes about the World
Trade Center terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001).302 Since hu-
mor theorists and legal thinkers write against the background of
shared moral judgments, manners, and tastes, one might expect them
to hold consistent views about what humor best promotes social well-
being. In other words, one would predict that law and nonlegal aca-
demic writing express similar social norms.
Much commends law's tendency to incorporate social norms.
One can expect citizens to more fully comply with legal rules when
the law tracks their shared values and understanding. When law and
300 See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 136, at 1164 (arguing that the "definitions of what is
funny or what is insult are socially constructed and embedded within existing power
relations").
301 Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?: An Economic Analysis of Internalized
Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1580 (2000); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develop-
ment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as "infor-
mal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized
sense of duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both").
One need not necessarily confine social norms to the nonlegal context. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 914, 915 (1996) (stating
that "we might, very roughly, understand 'norms' to be social attitudes of approval and
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done" and noting
that norms can be "codified in law"). The nonlegal definition, however, helps to empha-
size the notion that law integrates attitudes developed outside the legal context.
302 See Sunstein, supra note 301, at 914 (discussing norms for "good manners," "morally
abhorrent views," and "moral commitments"); Michael Ventre, Is it Still Too Soon for Jokes
About Sept. 11?, MSNBC, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26596867/
(describing the hostile audience reaction to Gilbert Gottfried's Sept. 11 joke).
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social values overlap, legal principles are more likely to appeal to citi-
zens and garner their respect.30 3 Moreover, courts promote predict-
ability by incorporating social norms into their decision making
because citizens can anticipate legal regulations based on shared atti-
tudes about appropriate behavior.30 4
For humor theory, social notions of appropriate behavior inform
the structure and definitions theorists emboss on different forms of
humor.30 5 Understanding how the law reflects these theories can
yield greater appreciation for what courts and other regulators are
accomplishing. The theories can also provide guidance to lawyers
who need to predict how courts might resolve a controversy, under-
stand existing case law, and gather raw material for advocacy. Simi-
larly, a court evaluating whether to protect a particular
communication (and wishing to avoid reversal on appeal) may use-
fully inquire whether the communication reflects incongruity, superi-
ority, release humor, or some other category identified by humor
theorists. Where understanding the humor categories can clearly
guide litigants, attorneys, and courts in the course of dispatching life's
duties, humor regulation becomes an instance where legal rules-
through the sometimes hapless machinery of the common law-can
produce effective and efficient results. 30 6
That's the good news for lawyers, judges, and those subject to
legal regulation (i.e., everyone). Self-conscious evaluation of poten-
tial humor regulation in light of humor theories promises to guide
decision makers choosing among alternatives. What's more, this Arti-
cle's positive analysis announces equally upbeat news for humor theo-
rists-illustrating how a human institution (the American legal
system) validates the relevance and accuracy of humor research from
the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. 307 Moreover, to
303 See Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 925, 937 (2004) ("Straightforward, uncomplicated legal
principles are more likely to appeal to the minds and intuitions of the governed, to reso-
nate within them, and to garner the respect and emotional attachment that ensure that
citizens will actually honor and obey the law.").
304 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 301, at 341 ("Norms are a vitally useful tool for ex-
plaining behavior and predicting the effect of legal rules.").
305 See subpart I.B.
306 I take no position on whether the common law's incorporation of humor theory
ultimately promotes the most efficient results that law can accomplish. See, e.g., Paul G.
Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm
Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2027, 2062 (2001) (delineating ways in which law can ensure
an efficient equilibrium where social norms may not be effective in doing so). Instead, I
argue only that efficiency results from the overlap between law and social norms because
the overlap helps to ensure that law is more understandable, respectable, and predictable.
307 Presumably, this is also good news for perennially insecure legal academics, who
for once can see how their discipline supports the social sciences, humanities, and natural
sciences-rather than vice versa.
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the extent that humor scholars advocate for the individual and social
benefits of incongruity humor, one might even say that the law's spe-
cial solicitude for that humor reinforces those beneficial effects (and
supports the advocacy).
B. Cause for Concern
Alas, I am not entirely sanguine-the potential salutary effects of
humor theory's overlap with common law does not end the analysis.
As a normative matter, I question whether traces of the three humor
theories in American law predict the best long-range future for humor
regulation. For one thing, the burgeoning humor literature and
nuanced theories that now provide usual fare for humor theorists sug-
gest that more refined analysis waits for law to use it.308 Moreover,
even assuming that the tripartite humor scheme were the current
"gold standard," the law should not necessarily always favor incon-
gruity humor and disfavor the two others. The tripartite scheme does
not restrict courts to the boundaries of general social norms. Instead,
regulating humor casts courts in the role of monitoring taste, a peril-
ous enterprise in a free society,30 9 particularly when done uncon-
sciously. Although thoughtful use of the three theories might guide
courts in making difficult choices and assist lawyers in providing ad-
vice and predicting litigation outcomes, humor embodies complexi-
ties beyond the theories' reach and courts' understanding. 3 10 As
documented by both legal and nonlegal scholars, humor both reflects
and perpetuates complex power dynamics that are difficult to predict
and dangerous to regulate. 31 1
1. Regulating Taste
By "taste," I mean a sense of decorum for what is appropriate in a
given context-informed by personal preference as well as commu-
nity standards. 3 12 Although the line between taste and social norms is
308 Some theorists have presented new, comprehensive theories. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Veatch, A Theory of Humor, 11 HUMOR: IN-'LJ. HUMOR RES. 161, 161-62 (1998). Other
theorists have focused on refining existing understandings of the three categories. See, e.g.,
La Fave et al., supra note 65 (refining superiority theory); Veale, supra note 69, at 420
(refining incongruity theory).
309 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(asserting that judgments about taste are "not for the Government to decree"); Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (stating in the context of a copy-
right decision that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits").
310 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
311 See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 323-38 and accompany-
ing text.
312 In his study of parody, Jerry Palmer captures the idea of taste through his descrip-
tion of "decorum." See Palmer, supra note 25, at 93. Palmer defines decorum as "the ap-
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blurred, my discussion here confines taste to evaluating whether an
expression is proper or fitting to an occasion. To inform their judg-
ments about taste,judges need not confine themselves to broadly held
norms.
Of the three areas of law I evaluate in this study, trademark and
sexual harassment law furnish the most obvious opportunity for courts
to regulate taste. In both substantive areas, courts canvass the facts of
cases before them for evidence of humor that imposes harm. This, of
course, is entirely reasonable given the civil law's goal of ensuring that
perpetrators of injury put injured parties in the position they would
have occupied were it not for the wrongs perpetrated. 13 Problems
arise, however, because the analysis of whether a legally remediable
injury has occurred requires the court to evaluate whether the "hurt"
flowing from humor is legitimate. During this legitimacy determina-
tion, courts make judgments about taste. So, for example, courts ask
whether a parody is so sleazy as to derogate the defendant's mark or
confuse consumers.3 14 And courts evaluate whether sex jokes are so
over-the-top as to position workplace humor beyond what Judge Pos-
ner describes as the level of "sex-saturated vulgarity" that American
plaintiffs are now expected to tolerate.3 15 In this study, we have seen
courts characterize humor as "depraved,' 3 16 "vulgar," "deplorable,"31 7
"tasteless, boorish," 318 or even evincing "barnyard type cruelty" that
"[t] 'aint funny."319
While the sexual harassment and trademark cases bear the most
direct evidence of taste regulation, the contract cases also show similar
potential. Contract cases evaluate whether a putative joke is suffi-
ciently funny to remove it from contract regulation. In effect, the
court's task is to ensure that plaintiffs do not get a reward for failing to
propriateness of expression to themes and settings." See id. Palmer describes an illustrative
breach of decorum as the erection of the "parody of a war memorial." Id. The breach
arises because "[w]ar memorials have a clear stylistic unity... they are always solemn, and
use forms that are locally considered appropriate for commemoration." Id.
313 See, e.g., Pizani v. M/V Cotton Blossom, 669 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
purpose of compensatory damages ... is to place the injured person as nearly as possible in
the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred." (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
314 See, e.g., supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for evaluation of the "sexually
depraved" nature of the humor in the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case.
315 Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995).
316 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d
Cir. 1979).
317 See supra note 268 for various courts' characterizations of "vulgar" and
"deplorable" humor.
318 Champagne v. Norton, No. 4:06-cv-024, 2007 WL 1434899, at *7 (D.N.D. May 14,
2007).
319 See McIntyre v. Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 669 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129, 131
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text for further discussion
of this case.
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"take a joke."320 In deciding whether a defendant produced a true
joke, courts have the opportunity to project notions of decorum on
the attempted humor.
Many problems arise from taste regulation. First, a court may ap-
ply a standard of taste that deviates from mainstream or consensus
views. 321 Mainstream views may be difficult to identify and subject to
varying interpretation; indeed, the striking indeterminacy in the
trademark cases suggests difficulties in identifying a uniform standard
of propriety. A second, related problem is the strong likelihood in a
pluralist society that tastes differ across social strata and that courts
systematically prefer one social class's tastes over another. Courts'
preference for incongruity humor might be symptomatic of this-with
courts identifying incongruity with "wit," a form of humor long associ-
ated with privileged upper classes.322
Even where courts might identify a high degree of social consen-
sus to condemn particular humor, prudence counsels them to hesitate
before transforming condemnation into law. Echoing wisdom also ex-
pressed by such legal thinkers as Robert Cover,323 philosopher Ted
Cohen observes: "some jokes on some occasions, and maybe some
jokes on all occasions, are . . . 'in bad taste,' and should be thought of
as morally objectionable .... [But n]ot everything you dislike is ille-
gal, or should be."324
Creating legal rules through litigation may also have the unin-
tended effect of suppressing humor that promises individual and so-
cial benefit. When courts enter judgments adjudicating specific
parties' rights, they also send a warning to others considering similar
activities. Responding to this message of deterrence, citizens may
overreact-allowing for an unnecessarily large buffer between their
own activity and activity specifically proscribed by legal rule. The law's
regulatory effect is thus broader than the letter of the law. Whether
evaluating the wisdom of a corporate advertising campaign, creating a
parody of a protected trademark, or drafting sexual harassment poli-
320 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
321 Indeed, the law's proscriptions reflect norms that are sometimes contrary to the
beliefs held in society. See C.A. Harwell Wells, Note, The End of the Affair?: Anti-Dueling Laws
and Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1808-11 (2001) (exploring
how individuals continued to duel despite the legislatures' passage of anti-dueling laws).
322 See supra note 31 and accompanying text for discussion of the class connotations of
humor categories.
323 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983) ("The rules and principles ofjustice, the formal institu-
tions of the law, and the conventions of a social order are .. .but a small part of the
normative universe that ought to claim our attention.").
324 COHEN, supra note 25, at 75, 82-83. ("Not everything you dislike is immoral. But
something's being legal and morally acceptable doesn't mean you have to think it is OK.
Nor does it mean you have to put up with it.").
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cies, decision makers labor under the weight of risk aversion and diffi-
culties distinguishing between lawful and lawless humor.325
Legal scholars document this over-regulation in the employment
discrimination context, where corporate culture generally pursues a
conservative (i.e., cautious) path.3 26 Management responds to sexual
harassment laws "by reinterpreting [the law's] ideals and infusing
them with managerial values." 327 In this way, the goal of avoiding sex
discrimination in employment can transform into a general mission of
removing all sexuality and laughter from the workplace 328 -a result
that can impoverish work as a source of meaning and joy in employ-
ees' lives.
2. Humor's Complexity
As trumpeted in First Amendment rhetoric, regulation of expres-
sion risks muting outlying values and tastes, which society might bene-
ficially evaluate and debate. 329 The resulting silence may fuel what
one legal theorist describes as law's "norm-destroying capacity."330
That is, through the process of legal compliance, law privileges main-
stream ideas at the expense of those closer to the fringe. Although
fringe or unpopular ideas might support beneficial social norms-or
at least act as a clarifying foil for them-the ideas remain unex-
pressed, and beneficial norms are consequently less vibrant. Reduc-
ing the array of goods available in the market place, the theory holds,
harms beneficial norms and ideas that are expressed.
For hurtful communication such as that regulated in contract,
trademark, and sexual harassment litigation, the answer is not neces-
sarily a complete moratorium on regulation by law in favor of regula-
tion by the marketplace of ideas. As Lawrence Lessig observes, not all
325 See, e.g., Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 265 (documenting how employers, lawyers,
and insurers inflate the risk of employment discrimination litigation); Bernard J. Wolfson,
Office Chat About Clinton Scandal Could Create Harassment Minefield, ORANGE CouNTY REG.,
Oct. 5, 1998, at Al (noting difficulties "distinguishing between legitimate workplace con-
versation and subjects that are still off-limits").
326 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 25 ("Prudent employers still feel compelled...
to enforce speech guidelines that go well beyond what the letter of the Supreme Court
precedent requires.").
327 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2088 (2003). Eugene
Volokh makes this point as well. See, e.g., Volokh, Hostile Work Environment, supra note 2
("[Some] employers . . . consequently suppress any speech that might possibly be seen as
harassment, even if you and I would agree that it's not severe or pervasive enough that a
reasonable person would conclude that it creates a hostile environment.").
328 Schultz, supra note 327, at 2069-70.
329 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1973) (recognizing that the "harsh
hand of censorship of ideas" may stifle expression both "good or bad, sound or unsound").
330 Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2055, 2057 (1996).
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ideas have the same dynamic in human society.33 1 Lessig reasons that
the free trade concept works best for "truths" that can be verified in
nature (such as the sum of two and two). 332 For matters that humor
regulation focuses on-such as workplace practices that reinforce the
view that women are inferior to men-the marketplace analogy breaks
down, since these matters are contingent on social definition. Lessig
explains that, for some phenomena, a reality exists separate from what
we say about it (two plus two equals four, no matter how much one
might say something different). 333 Yet for other phenomena (such as
the appropriate view of women), the reality is "in an important sense
constituted by what we say about it. ' 3 3 4 Indeed, recognizing this dy-
namic in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,3 35 the court understood
that "sexual joking" can stereotype women "in terms of. . . sex object
status."336 For these reasons, the welfare of a social organization is not
necessarily served by abdication of all regulation on the expression of
ideas.
Lessig's distinctions among idea types inject complexity into the
enterprise of identifying optimal legal regulation for hurtful expres-
sion. This complexity multiplies in the context of humor, which has a
mysterious character with diverse human aspects (social, cognitive,
emotional, psychophysiological, and behavioral) .337 One of the tricki-
est parts of humor is its paradoxical quality. Indeed, theorists have
shown that humor can be simultaneously confining and liberating,
emotional and cerebral, as well as loving and aggressive. 338 Whatever
its object, humor "can operate for or against, [and can] deny or af-
firm."339 In the context of discrimination, humor can not only "rein-
force[ ] pejorative images, '3 40 but it can also "inver[t] . .. such
stereotypes," thereby shedding honest insight into prejudice.3 4 1
Humor's bipolar nature creates a puzzling dynamic for regulators
concerned with compensating hurt, increasing efficiency, and
331 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1036-37
(1995) (discussing "the marketplace muddle" as it relates to the distinction between truths
of "nature" and understanding created by "social reality").
332 Id. at 1037.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
336 Id. at 1504-05.
337 See ROECKELEIN, supra note 15, at 23 (citing Martin, supra note 16), and supra notes
10-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of humor's many aspects.
338 See, e.g., BILLIG, supra note 28, at 17-19 (linking to humor the dialectic of love and
aggression); MEL WATKINS, ON THE REAL SIDE: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COMEDY 18
(Lawrence Hill Books 1999) (1994) (observing that white people view black laughter as
both a source of paranoid concern and a "source of comfort" and amusement).





preventing harm. On one hand, these aims counsel regulators to be
particularly watchful of humor's aggressive side. Yet this aggressive
quality also enables humor to serve its own important policing func-
tions. This policing capacity comes from humor's pugnacious side,
which enables humor to push boundaries and question received wis-
dom. 342 As George Orwell asserted, "Every joke is a tiny revolu-
tion. '343 Regulators thus face a dilemma because the same quality
that makes humor useful to society also makes it capable of significant
harm.
One response to this dilemma posits that humor operates as its
own check, providing a system of self-regulation that counsels a hands-
off approach to legal regulation. As is usually the case with humor,
however, this ready answer is overly simplistic. Humor's self-regulat-
ing quality operates as a rolling dialectic, a prism of reflections and
contradictions that creates shifting groups of insiders and outsiders.3 44
While insiders might use humor to belittle outsiders, outsiders might
deploy humor to challenge social hierarchy. This outsider humor can
make fun of the conventional, critiquing collective judgments as well
as mocking mainstream norms and behaviors. When this mockery is
appreciated by a group that shares in the laughter and fun, the humor
starts to create a new community of insiders. But, when subsequently
redeployed to the exclusion of others, the humor creates a new group
of outsiders-those who either personally serve as the "butt" of the
jokes, who do not think the jokes are funny, or who are members of
the group that the jokes mock.345
342 Michael Pickering & Sharon Lockyer, Introduction: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hu-
mour and Comedy, in BEYOND A JOKE, supra note 25, at 1, 14 (pointing out humor's potential
for challenging orthodoxies).
343 GEORGE ORWELL, 3 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE
ORWELL 284 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).
344 In addressing humor's paradoxical quality, Professor Michael Billig finds guidance
in Herbert Marcuse's notion of the "dialectic of civilization," which concerns a cyclical
process of repression and rebellion within society. See BILLIG, supra note 28, at 242 (citing
HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CVILIZATION 78-105 (2d ed. 1974)). Billig concludes that no
permanent equilibrium exists between humor and seriousness and that "[e]ach needs the
other for its existence, even as they struggle for momentary supremacy." Id. See supra notes
126-44 and accompanying text for further discussion of humor's double-edged quality and
capacity to generate "feedback loops."
345 Tierney, supra note 23, at F6 ("Laughter can be used cruelly to reinforce a group's
solidarity and pride by mocking deviants and insulting outsiders, but mainly it's a subtle
social lubricant. It's a way to ... make clear who belongs where in the status hierarchy.").
Beth Quinn is particularly eloquent in describing how this phenomenon operates for sex-
ual harassment:
When men use sexist humor as a medium of masculine solidarity, woman
coworkers are in the contradictory position of needing to be in-group as
coworkers, yet find themselves to be out-group as women.... In this context,
men may gain power over an individual woman by calling attention to her
difference, that is, to her womanliness .... In the case of insider humor,
however, that the humor is sexist or overtly sexual may be of secondary
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One might conclude that legal regulation is not only incapable of
controlling this fluctuating power balance but also unnecessary given
the self-regulating system. Yet even if this were hypothetically true on
an aggregate or meta-level, 346 a hands-off approach is not justified.
Courts must respond to complaints of real harm to individual people.
In addition, humor's mysterious nature undermines any guarantee
that the dialectic operates so elegantly or effectively. Outsiders might
not always succeed in harnessing humor's force to challenge power
relations in society. What is "funny" coming from a powerful person is
not always "funny" coming from the disempowered. Moreover, hu-
mor is neither predictable nor accurate in its regulatory function. 34 7
Instead, as Henri Bergson notes, humor occurs "spontaneously." 34 8
He explains,
[I]t does not therefore follow that laughter always hits the mark or
is invariably inspired by sentiments of kindness or even of jus-
tice .... [L]aughter is simply the result of a mechanism set up in us
by nature or, what is almost the same thing, by our long acquain-
tance with social life .... Laughter punishes certain failings some-
what as disease punishes certain forms of excess, striking down
some who are innocent and sparing some who are guilty .... In
this sense, laughter cannot be absolutely just.349
Thus, although in many instances, the natural oscillation between
negative and positive humor might perform important checking func-
tions, humor alone cannot be trusted to avoid the type of serious per-
sonal harm for which courts generally deploy their resources.
Therefore, despite humor's elusive and complex nature, regulation is
necessary.
concern. The main harm lies in the continual reassertion of a woman's
outsider status.
Quinn, supra note 136, at 1175-77.
346 Humor theorists Michael Pickering and Sharon Lockyer present an analysis sug-
gesting that outside regulation (presumably by law, social norms, or both) is actually neces-
sary for humor's existence:
Paradoxically, making offensive jokes about others with total impunity
would mean that there are no boundaries to push at any more. This would
lead to the defeat of humour .... Humour is only possible because certain
boundaries, rules and taboos exist in the first place. Their existence, along
with the satisfaction and sense of agency gained in overcoming them, are
equally vital to why we laugh.
Pickering & Lockyer, supra note 342, at 14-15.
347 Cf COHEN, supra note 25, at 70 ("[W]hen [Mark Twain] said 'Against the assault of
laughter nothing can stand,' he neglected to note that some things should remain
standing.").
348 BERGSON, supra note 12, at 198.




Humor presents a remarkable case study in the brilliance and foi-
bles of the common law system. Through the lenses of contract,
trademark, and sexual harassment cases, we see courts fumbling their
way to the same wisdom that humor theorists took centuries to de-
velop. Thus, preferences for incongruity humor, penalties for release
and superiority humor, as well as celebrations of parody and protec-
tions for puns are now well established in legal doctrine. And all this
occurs while courts engage in the important governmental function of
tailoring remedies for individual harms and signaling rules for all citi-
zens to fashion their behavior. Yet this apparently spontaneous con-
fluence of humor theory and law also creates an opportunity for grave
harm to society with court decisions stifling a host of beneficial forces.
Creativity, self-regulation in social relations, and personal pleasure in
comedy are only a few of the benefits that courts might undermine.
The question, then, becomes how to strike a balance. How do we
guide courts to interfere only where humor becomes too hateful, too
superior, too inane, or too foul to regulate social ills or bring suffi-
cient benefit to anyone? Thankfully, at least three important bodies
of knowledge stand ready to assist. First, a rich literature of law and
social norm theory awaits further mining.3 50 Next is the vast library of
First Amendment studies. In this Article, I gave First Amendment
principles a wide berth-concerned that the blinding, sometimes cat-
egorical, nature of First Amendment jurisprudence might distract
from subtle problems presented by humor regulation. Yet First
Amendment literature obviously provides important insights and
mandates for humor regulation that were developed after years of
struggles with hate speech and other potentially harmful communica-
tion. These two bodies of work, however, cannot alone inform the
task of understanding humor's sources, internal functions, and effects
in society. Only with the help of the humor theorists can courts suc-
cessfully navigate humor's mysteries as they dispatch their duty to reg-
ulate "funny."
350 See supra notes 301-04 for a sampling of law and social norm literature.
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